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Some  argue  that  the  complexity  and uncerainty of civil  savice
refonn place  the field  outside  .he Bank's comparative  advan-
tage. But a retreat from civil service  management  reform is
tantamount  to denying the crucial importance of government
adminisu'ative  capacity  to implement  economic  and social  pro-
grams. A more realistic approach  is to ty  to learn, through  tir
and error,  how to make  such  programs  work better.
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This paper - a product of the Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development Division.
Country Economics  Department  -- is part  of a larger effort in PRE to assess the Bank's accomplishments.
problems,  and pmspects in the field of public sector management  An earlier version of the paper was
presented at a December 1989  conference  on "lstitutional  Development  and the World Bank."  Copies
are available fre  from the World Bank, 1818 H Sret  NW, Washington  DC 20433. P¶ease  contact Rose
Malcolm. rmom  N9-055, extensionJ7495 (50 pages with tables).
After rviewing civil service refomn  work in the  twice he present amount of staff supervision
Bank. Nunberg and Nellis reach certain conclu-  and specialized expertse.
sions:
Such technical assistance  ans require mor
The impact of Bank pgrams  to contain the  time to prepar  and implement than do infrm
cost and size of civil services thrugh  emer-  strcu  projecs.  Tey  often get shor, shrift
gency reform of pay and employment  policies  because of their dependence on the scheduling
has so far been negligible. Reform efforts have  and requirements  of structual  adjustnent
not been ambitious enough; meaningful change  lending. On the other hand, without SALs,
wiU require more foreful  reform. Middle-range  many civil service reforms in TALs have no
measurs  such as voluntary departure schemes  teeth
and eardy  rtirment  prgrams  are useful but ar
not a substitute for biting the bullet.  Most Bank activities have concentrated on
shor-term cost-containment  measues.  More
Whedtr mot  aggressive rforn  is feasible  emphUsis  must be given to longer-tern manage-
is parly a technical but mainly a political issuc  ment issues if sustained  improvement in govem-
But in the few countries where reform has been  ment administrative  capacity is to take place.
carried out  the political costs were lower than  More atention must be placed on devising a
most govemmnents  (pettaps even the donors)  cohernt  overarching strategy and detailed
expected. This may have been partly because of  tactics for civil service reform.
the surprising capacity of labor markets to
absorb surplus government  workers and panly  Some argue thau  the complex and uncertain
because of the skillful handling of reforn.  nature of civil service reforn places the field
outside the Bank's comparaEive  advantage.
Functional reviews and competency testing  They argue that the Bank should confine itsclf to
prmvide  symbolic assurance  that the reform  helping define economicolly  rtional  policies,
prcess  will be fair. Retraining.  redeployment.  such as the appmpriate.  affordable size of the
credit, and public works programs for rdundat  wage bill.
employees ar  symbolically  and politically
effective but have limited practical impact and  But the Bank cannot identify the need to
are administraively diffiCUlt  remove X thousand surplus personnel and
assume that the  job of removing them will be
The Bank should no longer encourage or  carried out by the government  or a bilateral
support mechanisms such as topping up execu-  donor. The ctallenge for the Bank is to design
tive-level salaries for key govermment  posts  projects that have measurable  short-  run cost-
unless such incentive schemes are part of an  containment  goals but realize them in the
acticn strategy for long-term structural reform.  context of a strategy to solve the fundamental
management  problems in the long run.
Technical assistance loans (TALs) for civil
service management should probably provides
The  PRE Wortking  Papa Senes dissaninmaes  Lhe  rlndings  o( work under  way in the  Bank's  Policy.  Resex&ch.  and  Extcmraa
Affas  Comptel. An obcuve  of  he x  ts  X  n  sswet  . eLndinp  out quickly. even if premntaions  e le  than  fuliy
potishL fLT findings.niuprtaui  and  conclusions n  thm  papm  do not nenarily  r-pucsnt  ozTicial  8aitk  poitcy.
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The  emphasis  placed  by  the  World Bank in  recent  years  on the  major  overhaul
of  devloping  country  economies  has  accentuated  the  importance  of  adequate public
sector  admistrative  capacity,  espe:ially  within  the  central  core  4.&  government,
that  is,  the  civil  service.  Incr:esingly,  the  ability  of  civil  services  to  carry
out  the  critical  --  mach  less  the  routine  --  functions  of  government  has been
found  severely  deficient.  Purthermore,  the  size  and  cost  of  many civil  services
have  been  de4med  excessive  and  have  thus  become  key  targets  of  adjustment.  In
a real  sense,  this  growing  concern  vith  containing  the  size  and  improving  the
performance  of  the  civil  service  signifies  nothing  less  than  the redimensioning'
of  the  state,  reflecting  a  fundamental  shift  in  the  direction  of  the  BDank's own
policies.  The new  visdom  is  to  'ma=nage  lose  --  but  better.
This  paper  surveys  recent  Dank  experience  in  civil  service  reform,  and
begins  to assese  the progress  made.  To  the  extent  that  conclusions  about
'right"  and  'wrogg  strttegies  can  be  reasonably  drawn,  soo  guidance  is
offered,  with  the caveat  that  it.  is too  early  to  offer  definitive  policy
prescriptions  in  this  area.  Most  operational  and  evn  policy  work  on  these
issues  is  still  at  an  incipliat  stage,  of  a  duration  of  a few  years  or  less.
The  papor  focuses  on  two  separate  but  related  aspects  of  civil  service
refom  work  in  the  Bank.  One  deals  with  the  shcrter-term,  emergency  steps  to
refora  public  pay  and  employment  policies.  These  reforms  usually  focus  on
measurec  to  contain  tho  cost  and  size  of  the  civil  service,  mostly  in  the  context
of  structural  adjustment  lending.  The  other  set  of  reforms  are  those  dealing
vith  longer-range  civil  service  strengthening  efforts,  some  of  which  may support
variouc  of  the  nearer-teor  cost  containment  measures,  but  most  of  which  are
directed  toward  ongoing,  sustained  maagement  improvements.  Many  of  these
reforms  have  been  included  in  technical  assistance  projects  --  either  those  that
stand  alone  as 'development  management'  operations  or  those  that  constitute
direct  institutional  support  for  specific  actions  taken  in  SALs.
Many of  the  issues  discussed  in  the  papor  have  been  the  subject  of  earlier
World  Bank  reviews.  1  Material  from  these  analyses  is  synthesized  and  updated
where  data  permit. In  particular,  some  of  the  papor's  concepts  and  much of  its
findings  stem  from  research  currently  being  conducted  by  the  Africa  Technical
Department  (Public  Sector  Management  Division)  for  a  study,  *Public  Sector  Pay
Sm. Geoffrey  Lamb, Institutioral  fofarn:  Som Lesons  from Structural  Adjustment
Lnding,'  1984; and. Berbera  unberg, 'Publc  Sctor  Pay and EmpIoymnt  Rdefors,e  World
Bnk  Disusslon  PoPw' No. 68. 1989; add  eRvlw of  Public Sector  Management  issues  In
SUructural Adjustment LondIng,  World Bank PRE  Working Par,  fortrio.ling  1990.and  Imploymnt  Reform  in  Africa,  forthcomling  in  1990.
The  organization  of  the  paper  is  as  follows:  Part  A focuses  on the  short-
term  pay  and  eployment  reform  issues.  Section  I reviews  some  current  analytic
approaches  to  the  goveraennt  pay  and  employment  problem.  Section  II  discusses
the  BDnk'-  experience  with  these  reforms  through  its  lending  operations  and  tries
to  assess  *heir  .ovetall  impact  to  date. Part  B of  the  paper  examines  the  longer-
term  civil  service  management  issues,  analyzing  the  maln  types  of development
management  initiatives  undertaken  through  recent  Bank  operations.  Conclusions
are  then  drawn  about  this  experience.  The  final  section  of  the  paper  attempts
to  drew  the  findings  of part  A  and  3 together  and  offers  recovmendations  for
future  work.
Part  As  Pay  and  Employment  Reform:  Short-Term  Issues
1.  The  Problem:  Analytic  Approaches
Recent  analytic  vork  on  public  pay  and  employment  issues  has  provided  a
general  understanding  of  the  broad  outline  of  tho  problem.  Governments  in  many
developing  countries  are  unable  to  manage  and  finance  thfir  civil  services.
Evidence  suggests  '...  declining  moral.  and work  effort  on  the  part  of  government
workers,  problems  in  staffing  large  number*  of skilled  positions,  a  paucity  of
compleontary  inputs  ln  producing  government  services,  and  increasing  imbalance
botween  the  demand for  government  serrices,  and  the  provision  of  public  goods.  .2
Civil  services  in  many developing  countries  are  too  large,  too  expensive
and  insufficiently  productive;  and  civil  servants,  especially  thoso  in  managerial
positions,  are  poorly  motivated.  They  are  too  large  in  the  broad  sense  that  in
many states  the  public  sector  is over-extended:  i.e.,  it possesses  too  many
agencies  and  organizations,  charged  with  too  broad  a span  of  responsibilities;
and in the  narrower  sense  that  too  many  of these  agencies  employ  numbers  of
people  excessive  to  requirements  (in  the  sense  of  people  and  skills  needed  to
fulfill  off.cially  assigned  economic  and  administrative  tasks). They  are  too
expensive  in the sense  that  public  sector  wage  bills constitute  too  high a
percentage  of  total  government  revenues,  and  account  for  too  high  a percentage
of  CDP. The  agents  within  civil  services  tend  to  be  poorly  motivaced  in  that
remsneration  scales  for  upper  and  middle  managers  are  low,  often  extremely  low,
in  comparison  to  those  of  roughly  equivalant  posts  in  the  private  and  frequently
the  parastatal  sector;  and  wages  are  often  severely  compressed  -- the  highest  paid
earning  low  multiples  of  the  wages  of  the  lowest  paid. Many  civil  servants  are
insuffic±entlw  productive  in tho sense  that they do not fulfill  the tasks
assigned  to them (they  are  ineffective),  or they  carry  out their  assignments
partially,  with  great  delays,  at  high  cost  (they  are  inefficient).
208vid Undaucr et  al.,  Governeent  Wage Pollcy In Africa:  Some  Findings and Polcy
lssues,  World  Bank Research Observer, Vol. 3, No. I  (January.  1988), p.  1.  Particularly
acute  for  Afrlca,  such  problems  are  also  Increasingly  present  In  countries  as
gwgraohicallY  dispersed  as Srl  Lanka.  Bolivla.  Morocco, and Argentina,  to  name but  a
few.3
nalysis  within  the  Bank on these  issues  has tended  to focus  on four
problems  3
Excessive  oublic  sector  wage  bills.  Excessiveness  is  a  subjective  quality,
one for  which  no clear  measurement  methodology  exists,  and no standardized
approach  is  applied  throughout  the  Bank. The  extreme  cases  are  easy  to  identify;
i.e.,  where  public  sector  wage  bills  become  so  large  that  they  begin  to  'crowd
out'  other  high  priority  ilems.  In  general,  the  wage  bill  is  measured  against
one  of  the  follovings  the  overall  government  budget;  overall  government  revenues;
GDP;  or total  recurrent  expenditures.  The  latter  measure  is  perhaps  the  most
comon, and  the  degree  to  which  non-personnel  recurreut  expenditures  (such  as
those for  supplies  and maintenance)  diminish in  relation  to  personnel
expenditures  is  taken  as a key  signal  that  the  wage bill  is inappropriately
high.
SurDlus  numbers  of  civil  servants.  Although  obviousl?  related  to  the  size.
of the  wage  bill,  statements  about  the  "appropriate,  nwALer  of  civil  servants
are  often  derived  ad  hoc  from  the  proportion  of  public  servants  to  the  overall
population,  to the  moder  sector  labor  force, or  from somewhat  casual
observations  of  'too  many people  sitting  around  doing  nothing.  Sometimes  the
rate  of  expansion  of  public  employmnt  is  taken  as  a warning  signal  of  surplus
numbers  in  government.  Clearly,  the  definition  of  what  c=nstitutes  too  many'
in  the  public  sector  must  consider  the  relative  role  of  the  state  in  the  economy,
the  level  of  a  country,*  e,velopmant,  andthe relative  importance  of the  state
as  a  primary  source  of  9'.itictl  patronage  and  social  welfare. To identify  a
personnel  surplus,  most  -orld  Bank  reform  operations  rely  upon  the  indicator  of
insufficient  operating  budgets  for  supplies  and  maintenance.
Erosion  of  Public  Service  Salaries.  In  many  countries  the  level  of  re.l
public  sector  salaries  --  and  particularly  civil  service  salaries  -- h  .s  eroded
substantially  over  time,  The  result  is  remuneration  that  is  too  low  either  to
sustain  lower  echelon  workers  above  the  poverty  level  or to  attract  and  retain
needed  skilled  personnel.  Real  remunerations  are  significantly  affected  by  the
rate  of  inflation  and  the  regularity  and  nature  of  salary  adjustments.  Declines
if real  wages  have  often  been  cushioned  by elaborate  allcwances  or non-wage
benefit  structures  that  in  some  countries  have  become  an  increasingly  important
pairt  of the overall  compensation  package. A pervasive  irony  afflicts  many
ccuntriess  i.e.,  the  overall  salary  bill  is  too  high  while  wages  are  too  low.
This  dilemma  is  the  product  of  years  of trade-offs,  given  fiscal  constraints,
in  favor  of  hiring  growing  numbers  of  employees  at  diminishing  salaries.  Wage
erosion  is  particularly  a  problem  where  there  exists  an  alternative  market  for
public  servants,  either  through  a better  paying  parastatal  sector,  a domestic
private  sector  with  higher  salaries  and  benefits  or  an international  market  to
whicn  highly  skilled  public  servants  may  migrate.
Waie Compression.  In  many  cases,  compression  of  the  ratio  of  top  to  bottom
salaries  has  increasingly  been  identified  as  a  serious  constraint  on  governmentsI
ability  to attract  and retain  qualified  personnel  at the  middle  and  higher
3 Th/s  section  draws  heavily  on  Nunberg.  t989..4
loevls.  Wage compression  is partially  a function  of expansive  employment
policies  as  discussed  above,  but  in  some countries  it  may  also  derive  from  regime
preferences  for  agilitarian  salarr  structures.  This,  in  turn,  may hinge  on  the
ideological  character  of  the  regime  or  the  degree  to  vhich  its  political  support
is  drawn  from  the  lower  socioeconomic  strata.
Many  of the  general  principles  suggested  above  are  derived  from  the  only
available  data  base;  i.e.,  recent  pirical  analysis  of  wago and  employment
practices  in  a  group  of  African  countries. 4 The  general  analy-!-  and  sector  work
carried'out  in  the  Bank  (and  olsewhere)  as  well as  observatior.  gathered  through
operational  experience  confirm  these  findings  for  a broader  range  of cases.
These  findings  represent  a  significant  advance  in  our  understanding  of  this
pheonamnon.  Indeed,  the  low  wage/high  employment  scenario  in  depressed
aacroeconoeLcs  turns  on its  head  previously  accepted  wisdom  of  the  government
as  high  wage-giver.  ComparrAtive  data  that  would  permit  procise  measurement  ur
quantification  of  these  phenomena  remain  to  be  collected,  however.
In  short,  the  issue  is  difficnIlt  to  analyze. The  reasons  for  this  are
several.  Certainly,  a  standardized  view  of  the  proper  functional  span  and  size
of the  state  remains  elusive,  despite  the  sweeping  re-omrgence  of  liberal
notions  of minimalist  government.  For example,  even  in  societies  in  broad
ideological  agreoemnt  as to the appropriate  role  of the state,  there  is no
usarguable  criterion  that  deteraines  the  appropriate  number  of  ministries,  or
sub-divisions  of  ministries,  a government  should  posess; and  relative  prices
(wage  scales)  in  differing  labor  markets  might  provide  sound  economic  reasons
for  a wide variation  in employment  levels  in organizationi  having  roughly
quivalent  objectives.  furthermore,  the  range  of  solutions  to  this  quotion  may
vary  by  country,  region,  or  level  of  industrialization.  On the  other  hand,  there
is  no  clear,  linear  path  to  development  in  this  regards  large  states  with  high
numbers  of civil  servants  per capita  are  prevalent  in  both  the  developed  and
underdeveloped  world.
Vexing measurement  questions  are unresolved.  The methodology  for
determining  appropriate  wage  levels  for  private  and  public  sectors  continues  to
be  debated.  Ways  to  measure  productivity  for  central  government  agencies  have
been  the  subject  of  a  vast  but  inconclusive  literature,  Questions  remain  about
the  potential  consequences  of  public  sector  retranchment  programs.  The  relative
capacity  of  different  types  of  labor  markets  (rural-urban,  forml-informal)  to
absorb  redundant  labor  from  the  public  sector  is  poorly  understood.  And  analytic
techniques  for determining  the direct  and indiroct,  upstream  and dawnstream
costs and benefits  of various  reduction  in force scenarios  are still  very
primitive.
Political  economy features  of  public  pay  and  employmnt  practices  have  only
begun  to  be  analyzed.  The  real  as  opposed  to  the  perceived  political  risks  of
government  retrenchment  programs  are  neither  known  aor  at  present  calculable.
Which  are  the  key  bureaucratic  and  societal  coalitions  that  figure  in  employment
and  pay  reform?  How  much  reform  is  politically  feasible  for  a given  regime  to
undertake  under  what  conditions?
4Lunoauer  et al..  EltThere is,  in  sum,  a lack  of  agreement  on guiding  analytic  principles,  a
lack of fim  measurement  criteria,  and a great  regional  variation  in the
intensity  of  tue  syndrow.  Noretholess,  a growing  body  of  empirical  evidence
on  this  topic  --  accumulated  mainly  through  Bank  lending  experience  --  provides
sufficieht  information  for  at  least  a  preliminary  examination.  The  section  that
follows  highlights  the  more  striking  features  of  this  experience  and  then  draws
general  lessons  abovt  the  imple  entation  of  these  typos  of reforms.
2.  Recent  Bank  Operational  txoerience  in  Civil  Serice Reform
Since  1981,  civil  service  reform  has featured  prominently  in 61 Bank
lending  operations.  Of  these,  38  were  Structural  Adjustment  Loans  or  Credits
(CUL or  SACs), and  2Z  were  Technical  Assistance  Loans  or  Credits.  (Table  1  lists
lank  operations  with  civil  service  reform  components).  5 Four  operations  have  been
in  the  hKINA  region  (Europe,  Hiddle  East  and  North  Africa);  5 in  Asia;  11 in
Latiu  Amrica and  the  Caribbesan  and  4*  in  Africa. Thus,  two  out  of three  of
recent  Bank-supported  civil  service  reform  programs  have  been  in  Africa. The
magnitude  aad  intensity  of the  issue  is clearly  greatest  in that  region;  and
efforts  discussed  below  are  mainly,  though  not exclusivoly,  taking  place  in
Africa.  (Table  2  shows  the  regional  distribution  of  lank  operations  with  civil
service  reform  components  by  lending  instrument.)
Activity  is  quite  new  in this  field;  prior  to 1981,  the Bank  was only
tangentia,lly  involved  with  civil  service  or  administrative  reform  --  except  for
the  occ&sional  report,  such  as  on  Thailand  and  Indonesis,  and  some lnvolvement
by  educational  specialists  on  civll  service  training  instLtutes  --  and  what  was
-done  ws  *inaily  on the  project,  not the  policy,  level.  It  has  been  the  Bank's
entry  into  policy-based  lending,  with  its  amphassL on  demand  management  and
improvlng  the  performance  of  adjustinS  governments,  that  has  led  to  the  lncreased
involvement  with  civil  servLce  issues.
The most important  set  of  reasons  for  the  inclusion  of  civil  service  resorm
in zecent  adjustment  operations  center,  tround  the  issue  of  budgetary  burden,
the  recognition  of the  heavy,  fiscal  b-,  'en  posed  by large  wage  blls.  For
extreme  exampl*,  in  the  early  1980s,  following  rapid  increases  in  the  numbers
employed,  many African  countri,s  saw  their  wage  bLils  rise  to  account  for  more
than  half  of  total  government  revenues.  Such  increases  were  tolerable  (though
never  wise)  as long  aS  total  revenues  increased.  But  with  the  prolonged  economic
crisis  and its attendant  stagnation  of growth  ln government  revenues,  the
difficult-to-roduce  wage  bill  begins,  ts discussed  in the  preceding  section.
to  Ocrowd  out'  other  critical  current  expenditurest  maintenance  and  depreciation,
the  provision  of  essential  supplies  and  equipment.  This  led  to  the  lncreasingly
coaon  situation  of teachers  without  books,  doctors  lacking  medicine,  postal
workers  having  no stamps to sell,  etc.  The  recognitton  that  this  was  taking
place  led  some  governmeats  to  initiate  their  owe  rationallzation  measures.  It
led  the  Bank  increaslngly  to lnclude  .ivll  service  reform  in adjustment
-S,vern/  other  tyDes  of  policy-based  lending  operations,  such  as  Reconstruction
Inport  Credits  and  Econosic  Recovery  Credits  (R/Ca and  EfACs),  were  counted  among the
SAJs.  They  are  Iteoized  In  Table  1.operations.  Thus,  the  primary  reason  for  the  Bank's  more  recent,  intense  and
direct  approach  to civil service  :,form  has been the  need to help  borrower
governments  manage  demand,  to  cont'ln  and  reduce  a  major  cost  area.
The  second set of  reasons centers around the perception  of  low
effectiveness  and  efficiency  levels  in  goverrun  nt administrations,  attested  to
ir.  critical  cases  by  the  degradation  of  the  state-provided  (and  supposedly  state-
maintained)  physical  infrastructureI  and  even  in  the  less  critical  cases  1b  i4 .gh
transuction  costs, pervasive delays, and  the  prevalence  of  corruptlon.
nprovement  of  effectiveness  and  efficiency  levels  is  seen  as  the  essential  and
ultimate  goal  of administrative  reform. From  the  outset  it  was  thought,  and
experience  has  confirmed,  that  raising  those  levels  is  a  complicated,  problematic
and longer term effort.  The relation  of cost contsinment  measures eo
efficiency/effectiveness  promotion  is thus analogous  to  the relation  of
stabilization  to  the  restoration  of  growth  in  adjusting  economies:  i.e.,  issues
of  demad managemnt take  precedence  and  arc  easier  to  effect  than  restarting
of growth. For  civil  service  reform  one  could  easily  argue  that  is  should  be
the  other  vwy round;  that  assessing  vhat  the  organizations  of  the  ut¶te  need  to
do,  what  resources,  physical  and  human,  they  need  to  do  it,  and  how  to  go  about
doing it, should  precede  the question  of cost containment  and reductions.
Nonetheless,  becauso  of  the  magnitude  and  intensity  of  fiucal  problems,  the  cost
containment  steps  havo  been  soon  as  the  first  priority.
3.  Cost-Contaien.ntv  Operational  Aporoaches  to  Pay  and
Employmnt  Reform  --  A Progress  Report
-This  section  eszmL'ies the  most  recent  Bank  experience  in  pay  and  employment
reform,  analyzing  the short-term,  emergency  measures  taken (mostly  through
adjustment  operations  and  companion  technical  assistance  projects)  to  contain
the  size  and  cost  of  civil  services.  The  focus  is  on  the  period  since  1987  when
Bank-supported  pay  and  employment  reform  wva last  reviewed. The  purpose  here
is  to  provide  a progress  report  on  approaches  to  the  problem,  concentrating  on
their  implementation.  New  initiatives  that  have  been  devised  in  the  intervening
period  are also  analyzed. The following  section  evaluates,  on the basis  of
available  data,  the  overall  impact  of  these  measures  by  examining  general  trends
in wage  bill containment,  employment  increases,  and  rationalization  of
remuneration  structures.
Bank  operations  dealing  with  government  pay  and employment  issues  have
supported  a range  of  reform  approaches.  Many  of  these  have  been  implemented  on
a trial  and  error  basis,  and  we are  only  beginning  to leazn  about  which  are
working  and  which  are  not.  (The  key  measures  taken  by  countries  to  reform  pay
and employment  policies  are summarized  in Table  3).  With regard  to cost-
containment,  various  of these  actions  have been ranked  on a continuum  of
political  difficulty  ranging  from  the  easiest  --  undertaken  first  --  to the  most
difficult.  The main  steps  taken  have  been  the  fillowing:
--  the  elimination  of 'ghost'  or  non-existent  names  and  workers;
--  the  elimination  of  officially  sanctioned  posts  which  are  not
currently  filled;
--  the  retrenchment  of temporary  or  easonal  workers;the  enforcement  of  retirement  ago (or  retirement  efter  z years
of service)  stipulations:
the  freosing  of recruitment;
--  the  elimination  of  ;uaranteed  entry  to  the  civil  service  from
the  educat'onal  or  training  system;
-. the voluntary,  or  induced  by incentives,  retirement  of  surplus
workers;  and  finally
the  dismissal  of  serving  civil  servants.
A number  of  techniques  were  utilized  to  support  the  steps  outlined  above,
including:
--  Civil  Sorvice  Censuses
--  Functional  Reviews
-- Payroll  Computerization
--  Competency  Testing
-a  Public  Informtion  Campaigns
--  Redeploymnt  Training  and  Credit  Programs
'- Salary  Supplemnts
--  Skills  Mobilization--Senior  Executive  Programs
The  implementation  of  these  measures  are  dis:ussed  below.
Civil  Service  Censuses,  Payroll  Computerization  and  Clean-Up  and  Ghost  Reduction
Keasures
The  reduction  of  civil  service  cadres  through  the  elimination  of  ghosts  6
--  the  first  and  leaist  politically  sensitive  approach  to  employment  reform  --
appears  to have  been an effective  techniquo  in emergency  cost-containment
programs,  although  comprehensive  data  on reductions  accomplished  through  this
method  are  not yet available. (Table  4  presents  various  measures  taken  by
selected  countries  to  reduce  employment.)  For  Ghana  and  Uganda.  at  least,  ghost
elimination  represented  a  useful  instrument  of  employment  reform.  7 Ghost  removal
was  also  claiMed  to  have  been  a  significant  feature  of  reforms  in  various  other
countries.  After  a staff  audit  in  1987  in  Guinea,  for  example,  approximately
1091  ghost  names  were stricken  from  the  civil  service  'payroll.  In  Cameroon,
approzimately  5000  fict.tious  nams were  eliminated.  In  general,  ghost  reduction
Gftsts  are name  on tth  payroll,  receiving  a wage, who cannot  be shown to  ex/st
physically.  They are worAers who hove died, retired  or  otherwiso left  the  civil  service
but  were never recordod as such.  rhey are fictitious  persons  whose pay Is claimd  by
othes.  rThey  are variants  on a name with one prson  receivlng  two or  more salaries.
7Data on ghost  removals In  Ghans are  very  tentativo  and remain to  be  verifled.
Government claims that  11,O0  ghosts  were eslminated through  headcount  and  census
exercises  have  not  yet  been validated.  In  Uganda. approxlately  30,000 ghosts  have
been Identifled,  but  there  Is no evldence  that  those names  have been removed from the
payroll  as yet.incurs  low  political  costs  because  the  only  opposing  constituency  are  the  system
abusers  themselves.  for  whom a  public  admission  of  fraud  would  be  nocessary  to
stake  a  claim  to  continuing  payment.  Indeed,  in  none  of  the  above  cases  did  ghost
removal  generate  a  public  outcry.
The  first  step  in  ghost  removal  is,  normally,  a  civil  service  censuA  to
determine  the  numbor  and  type  of  government  employees.  In  many  countries,  such
a  poll  will  be  the  first  time  in  many years  (or  perhaps  the  first  time  ever)  an
attempt  has  been  made  to  got  an  accurate  picture  of  public  employment.  The  need
to  establish  who  is,  and  who  is  not,  legitimately  enrolled  on  the  civil  service
rosters  and  payroll  is  paramu.rAt.
Civil  soervice  censuses  and  payroll  sanitization  havo  been  features  of  a
number  of pay and cemployment  refoms as shown  in  Table 3.  Few  reforming
governments  have  ignored  the  issue,  though  soa have  proceeded  without  a  clean-
up  exercise.  Laos,  for  eample, is  reported  to  hav  shed  an  estimated  10  to  30
percent  of  government  workers  using  a payroll  listing  as the sole form  of
personnel  records. For  most  countries,  though,  a prior  data  collection  and
clean-up  activity  is  -scessary.  They  serve  so  -ral useful  purposes,  including
quantifying  the  often large  ranks  of  temporary  staff;  providing  information
leading  to  the  enforcement  of  the  statutory  retirement  age,  and,  most  important,
regularizing  payroll  lists  through  the  elimination  of  ghosts.
The  usefulness  of  ..  census  is  related  to  its  level  of  comprehensiveness
and  sophistication.  The  most  elemetal  census-takiug  exercise  may be  little  more
than  a  'head  count'  which  simply  establishes  ths.  number  and  the  structure  of
government  eployment  (i.e.  the  number  of  employes*  at  various  professional
lovels  or  in  different  regional  locations).  Censuses  of  the  head  count  variety
are  usually  desiSned  and  carried  out  by governmezts  themselves.  (At  early  points
in  the reform  process,  Ghana, Gambia, Guinea,  Bolivia  and Uganda and others
performed  hoad  counts  oan  their  own  without  technical  assistance.)  The  results
of  these  counts  have  often  beon  disappointing.  Findings  have  been  incomplete
and  inaccurate,  mainly  because  they  have  been  based  on  existing  civil  service
rolls  rather  than  verification  of  physically  present  employees.  While  not
expensive  to  undertake,  head  counts  of  this  sort  can  still  be  a  waste  of  scarce
resources,  since  they  must  usually  be  followed  by  more  rigorous  censuses  carried
out  by  outside  consultants.  On the  other  hand,  even  flawed  head  counts  can  serve
useful  purposes. Tn  Ghana,  the initial  civil  service  survey  revealed  the
overall  structure  of employment  which  clearly  indicated  overstaffing  at  lower
grades  of  tho bureaucracy,  providing  a  starting  point  for  policy  reform
discussions.
Sven  censuses that  are  more  sophisticated  in  their  validation
methodologies  may have  only  lIJ'ited  applications.  Successive  censuses  carried
out  by  international  consultL  .. s in  Ghana  (there  were  three  all  told)  used  the
payroll  mehanism  to  count  civil  servants,  but  they  did  not  actually  verify  the
physical  existence  of employees  --  the rationale  being that just getting
fraudulent  names  off the  payroll  nwas  good  enough. Neither  did  they  establish
durable  links  betwoen  the  computerized  payroll  system  in  the  Ministry  of  Finance,
the  personnel  records  in  the  Office  of  the'  Head  of  the  Civil  Service,  and  the
annual  budget.  The  censuses  did,  however,  provide  important,  one-shot,  baseline
data  to begin  the  employment  reduction  program,  thus  fulfilling  an essential9
function.
&t least  tWO  pgoblems  can  be  seen  with  the  Ghanaian  approach.  One  is  that,
vithout  the  institutional  capacity  to  utilize  the  data in a  computerized
monitoring  system,  the  quality  of census  data is  subject  to rapid  erosion.
Results  becomA  outdated  quickly  as  new  recruits  enter  the  civil  service  (openly
or clsndestinely)  and  as  others  leave. Personal  data  which  might  provide  an
overall  profile  of  the  administration  also  change,  so that  information  about
stpects  such  as the  age structure  and  promotion  pattevus  is  no longer  valid.
Moreover,  it  is  important  to  be  able  to  capitalize  on  the  results  of  the  census
quickly  because  the patience  of civil  servants  to endure  successive  surveys
wears  thin,  as  has  been  the  case  in  Ghana  after  three  such  ezercisus  in  a  period
of a fev  years.  However,  "doing  it right*  also imposes  administrative  and
financial  burdens.  In  Madagascar,  the  census  was  more  rigorous;  enumerators  were
hired  and  civil  servants  had  to  be  present  at  the  place  of  census.  The  penalty
for  ton-cooperation  was  severet  suspension  of  paycheck.  Thus,  participation  was
high. The  cost  of  this  elaborate  exercise  was  a  non-trivial  five  percent  of  the
wage bill.  however.  Furthermore,  the  organizational  requiremonts  for  execution
of  the  census  --  i.e.  organizing  review  committees,  enumerators,  census  centers
at  both  central  and  district  levels  --  wege  also  considerable.
In general,  recent  experience  vith ;ensus  design  and implementation
suggeSts  that  such  mechanisms  are  important  first  steps  to getting  toe  reform
process  uavi,g;  that  their  design  should  be  kept  simple,  but strategic  in  the
sense  that  they  should  be  conceived  as  part  of  the  establishment  of  an  ongoing
system of  controls, and  thab.  their  successful  conceptualization  and
implementation  generally  requires  external  tecbnical  assistance.
Freezing  Civil  Service  Recruitment
Freezing  or limiting  civil  service  recruitment  is an oiten  applied
mechanism for  reducing  government  employment.  It is  only  marginally  more
politically  difficult  than  ghost  elimination.  (The difficulty  is  due to  the
potential  disruptions  that  might  be  causwd  by aspiring  civil  service  candidates.)
Hiring  freezes  have been  widely  used,  with  varying  results,  in a  number  of
countries,  including  Costa  Rica,  Ghana,  the  Central  African  Republic,  Congo.
Gambia,  Gabou  and  Mauritania,  among  others.  A variety  of  mechanisms  were  used
to  administer  these  policies.  Senegal,  for  example,  instituted  c  hiring  freeze
in  1983,  and created  a high-level  inter-ministerial  commission  to  supervise  the
process.  The  commission,  the  secretariat  of  which  met  weekly.  revievwd  all
departures  from  the  civil  service,  with a  view  to  determining  (a)  if  it  were
necessary  to  fill  the  particular  vicancy,  (b)  if  so,  with  whom,  and  (c)  if  not
whether  the  staff  of the  organization  could  be i.deu-d  by one  or  whether  the
or3anization  had  some  pressing  personnel  need  in  another  area  that  justified  a
position.  Between  1000  and  1500  reductions  were  reported  to  have  been  effected
in  the  first  two  years  of the  commission's  operation.  This  experience,  and  a
similar  but  stronger  scheme  in  the  Central  African  Republic.  are  summarized  in
the 'Box'  on  cost  containment  in  Annex 2.  Variations  on  this  theme  include
allowing  hiring  only  if  it  does  not  result  in  a  noet creation  of  civil  service
posts  (Kenya  has  tried  this);  or  limiting  hiri'g  to  essential  professional  staff
(in  force  in  Malawi,  Mali  and  Nigeria).10
Automatic  hiring  has  been  discontinued  in  some  African  countries  which  had
traditionally  guaranteed  government  jobs  to  school  graduates.  (Examples  are  CAR,
Congo,  Gu4  *a,  Mali,  Somalia,  Sudan,  and  Senegal.) This  reform  measure  turns
out  to  be  somewhat  complicated  to  implement,  as  the  case  of  Senegal  demonstrates.
When the  hiring  freeze  was instituted  in Senegal,  there  were  more than  forty
government  schools  and  training  centers. Prior  to  the  freeze,  entry  to  these
centers  equalled  entry  to  the  civil  service.  The  freeze  forced  the  Senegalese
to  curail severely  the  entry  to  and  activities,of  these  centers;  the  result  to
date  has  been  the  continued  existence  of  most  of these  institutions,  but  with
ever-declining  numbers  of  students  or  trainees.  Still, the  Senegalese
government,  as  moot  others  faced  with  this  problem,  maintained  its  employment
coitment  to  those  already  in  the  training  pipeline,  meaning  that  it  may be  some
years  before  an  effect  from  this  particular  lement  of  restructuring  can  be
perceived. 8
!A  general,  the  record  of  hiring  freezes  appears  to  have  been  mixed.  Where
they  have  signified  a  haLt  to automatic  civil service  recruitment  from
universities  or  public  administration  training  institutions,  they  apply  a
significant  brake  on civil  service  expansion.  But  recruitment  freezes  may
constrain  government  from  achieving  the  necessary  skill  mix  through  renovation
of  its  cadres  with  young  entrants.  Moreover,  for  some  civil  services,  hiring
freezes  may be  no -ore  efficient  in  eliminating  redundant  civil  servants  than
natural  attrition.  Indeed,  in  som countries  (such  as  Madagascar),  the  height
of  civil  service  ezpansion  took  place  in  the  early  1960s,  when  many  new  recruits
vere  hired,  causing  a  persistent  bubble  in  the  civil  service  rolls.  Hiring  then
leveled  off. It  could  be  argued  that  in  these  instances  it  makes  sense  to  let
natural  attrition  through  normal  retirement,  which  will  occur  over  the  next  few
years,  take  care  of  this  surplus.
Suspension  of  Automatic  Increases  and  Advancements
One  cost  containment  measure  which  has  come  into  increasing  use  in  the  most
recent  operations  is  the  suspension  of  automatic  increases  and  step  advancements.
This is of particular  relevance  in the francophone  African  countries  where
advances  in  grade  and  pay  tended  to  be  based  solely  on  years  of  service.  Thus,
freezing  recruitment  or  even  modest  reductions  in  the  total  number  of  the  civil
servants  soomtimes  has  had  but  a limited  effect. Senegal,  for  example,  froze
recruitment  as  early  as  1983,  and  even  succeeded  over  two  years  in  reducing  total
numbers. Still,  it  found  that  automatic  step  and  grade  increases  kept  the  wage
bill  on the  increase;  the  fiscal  result  of  what  the  Senegalese  regarded  as an
heroic  and politically  dangerous  effort  was reduction  in the annual  average
STho  Sengal  Case rases  another  ISsue:  the Adfalll  refoarA  In  the  parapublic
sector  Is  resulting  In  reduced  tVansfers  to  and, It  Is  hoped,  eventual  reductlon  In  the
numbers  of  public  enterprises.  But  many  of  the  staff  now employed  In  Senegalese  PEs
re  'tenured  civil  servants  who chose  or  were  assigned  to  servlco  In  a  PE. If  they  are
dismissed  from  thO  PE they  ha'oe  the  legal  right  to  a  post  In  the  civil  servico  proper.
Legal rights  can  be ended,  of  course.  but  only  at  the  expense  of  time, effort  and  the
expenditure  of  some of  the  government's  political  base.11
growth  rate  of  the  wage  bill  from  fourteen  to  nine  percent.  The  suspension  of
automatic  advances  is  an  element  of  recont  reforms  in  five  countries  with  Bank
programs,  including  Dominica  and  Mauritania. In  addition,  Burundi  and  Cots
d'lvoi:e  temporarily  suspended  automatic  pay  increases  to  dampen  drift  factors.
Both  Burkina  Faso  and  Cote  d'Ivoire  also  restructured  their  pay  systems  so  that
promotions  are now offered  on  a more selective  basis rather  than granted
automatically.
Strict  enforcement  of retirement  for  over-age  civil  *.rvants  has  boen  a
foature  of  a number  of  reform  programs  (including  Cameroon,  Gabon,  Costa  Rica,
and Benin,  Senogal,  Ghana,  and Guinea).  In Guinea,  for ezamplo,  the Bank
supported  the  enforcement  of a  retirement  program  in  which  all  civil  servants
over  55,  or all those  who had completed  thirty  years  of service,  were to be
placed  in  automatic  and  effective  retirement.  The  result  was  a  reduction  of  over
7000  cadres. While  presenting  an option  for  employment  reduction  that  causes
few  political  ripples,  the  impact  of  such  programs  has  been  minimal. This  is
partly  due to the  unreliability  of most information  about  age  --  even  when
gathored  by  modern  survey  techniques  through  civil  service  censuses  --  and  to
the  overall  age  profile  of  most  civil  services  in  most  LDCs. This  is  especially
the  caso  in  Africa,  where  the  average  age  of  civil  servants  is  bolow  40. Thus,
the  removal  of  over-aged  employees  usually  targets  a semll  group.
Early  Retiremnt  Proarams
Increasingly,  countrios  find  that  implementing  the  more  "easy  options  does
not result  in sufficient  cost  cutting. They thus  begin  to explore  ways to
actually  cut back  on  the  numbers  of  serving  employees. Even at this  stage,
governments  are loathe  to  take the  most difficult  political  route;  that  of
involuntary  dismissal. A number  of strategies  have  been  tried  with varying
degreos  of  success.  Usually,  these  options  are  offered  as  one  among  several  in
a  mized  approach  to  staff  reductions.
Early  retirement  is  an  option  that  has  been  proposed  in  several  countries,
including  Senegal.  This  program  targets  civil  servants  within  a  few  years  of
normal  retirement  age,  either  paying  them  a lump  sum  separation  package  with
pension  benefits  to begin  with normal  retirement  age,  or by starting  their
pensions  at  the  early  departure  date. Although  systematic  analysis  has  not  yet
been  performed  on  these  types  of  programs,  their  benefits  (in  terms  of  numbers
reduced  and wage bill decreases)  would seem to be minimal  and their  costs
significant.  First,  the  net  present  value  of the  savings  stream  is  likely  to
be  low  since  the  savings  only  represent  three  to  four  years  of  staff  reductions
instead  of those  that  would occur if  younger  workers  were to be removed.
Furthermore,  early  retirement  programs  target  the  most  experienced  employees  -
- both  at  managerial  and  support  levels. This  poses  a  particularly  acute  cost
for  those  civil  services  in  which  once  high  standards  of  professional  performance
and training  have  broken  down.  Early  retirement  means that  the collective
experience  of  the  older  employees,  who  might  be  the  sole  keepers  of  the  efficient
flam of  an  earlier  era,  is  lost  to  the  newer  generation.
Voluntary  Departure  Programs
Voluntary  departure  schemes  have  been  a feature  of  several  civil  service12
reform  programs,  including  those  in  Guinea,  the  CAR,  Mali,  Kenya  and  Somalia;
one  has  boen  proposed  for  Senegal.  In  general,  voluntary  departure  schemes  are
viewed  as politically  palatable  because  they are not coercive.  Voluntary
departure  programs  are  problematic,  however,  in  that  they  often  attract  the  best
and  brightest  civil  servants;  that  ls,  those  whom  government  would  most  wish  to
retain.  Carried  out  on  a  large  scale,  voluntary  departure  schemes  are  expensive.
In  Guinea, voluntary  departure  with  an  associated  premium  was  to  be  financed  with
an  earmarked  fund  of  GP  6.5  billion.  The  benefits  involved  a three-option  plan
from  which  departees  might  choose  tos  (a)  drav  a salary  with  accompanying  rice
rations  for  60 months;  (b)  take  40  percent  in  cash  and  the  remainder  in  regular
salary  payments;  or  (c)  take  a share  of  the  severance  allowance as a down  payment
on a new private  sector  business  venture.  In  its  proposed  voluntary  departure
scheme,  Senegal  would  offer  60  months  of  salaries  to  voluntarily  departing  civil
3ervants.  The government  has  requested  financial  support  for  this  scheme  from
the  lank.
Many countrils  would  prefer  to carry  out  staff  reductions  exclusively
through  voluntary  departure  programs,  particularly  if they  can find  external
financing  for  a portion  of the  costs.  Nonetheless,  it seems  clear  that  the
monetary  incentives  would  have  to  be significant  (and  probably  unaffordable)  to
encourage  sufficient  reductions  in numbers. On a smaller  scale,  some  civil
servants  might  have a low reservation  cost that  would permit  them  to take
advantage of  voluntary  departure  incentives  that  were  not  exorbitantly  expensive
for  government.  In this way, voluntary  departure,  when combined  vith
retrenchment,  could  be  a  viable  strategy  to  achieve  significant  employment
reduction.  Howevr, on its  own  it  is  probably  not  terribly  effective.
Retrenchment
Retrenchment  --  the direct  and explicit  dismissal  of redundant  civil
servants  --  is  the  most  difficult  and  politically  contentious  measure  used  to
reduce  employment.  Governments  have  strongly  resisted  these  remedies,  and  have
adopted  them  as  last  resort  options. This  reluctance  is  related  to  the  mature
of  the  state  in  many  developing  countries.  An  important  purpose  of  governments
is  construed  as the distribution  of political  patronage  and social  welfare
through  the  provision  of  public  posts  to  loyal  followers  and  otherwise  deserving
clients. Overt  employment  reduction  thus  strikes  at  this  basic  definition  of
the role  of government. Moreover,  the fear  of most political  regimes  that
retrenchment  will  incits  destabilizing  social  upheaval  and  political  opposition
serves  to  stiffen  resistance  to  overt  employment  reduction  masures.  The  task
of opponents  to staff  cuts  is  made that  much  easier  by fears  that  the labor
absorptive  capacity  of  the  private  sector  is  weak.
It  ls  thus  not  surprising  that  involved  Bank  staff  note  difficulties  and
delays  in  complying  with  staff  reduction  conditionality  in  adjustment  operations
in the  Central  African  Republic,  Guinea  Blissau,  Guinea,  Ghana, Sao  Tome and
Principe,  Senegal,  Costa  Rica and  Dominica,  to name  but a  few  recent  oases.
Supervision  reports  record acceptance  of  fwer  dismissals  and lengthier
timeframes  than  originally  negotiated;  these  reports  note  as  well in several
second  adjustment  operations  the  repetition,  in  somewhat  stronger  terms,  of
employment  reduction  conditions  seen  in  the first  operation  (SAL  1-  enforce
retirement age  regulations;'  SAL  2-'strictly  enforce  retirement  age13
regulationos).
Despite  the  considerable  resistance  of  governments  to  undertake  what  they
perceive  to  be politically  risky  measures,  retrenchment  is nonetheless  taking
place  in  several  countries  through  Bank operations.  Ghana,  Guinea,  Gambia,  and
CAR (countries  for  which  some  documented  reduction  figures  are  available)  are
cases  in pointa  as of 1989,  approzimately  27,791  civil  servants  have been
retrenched  ln Ghana,  in addition  to those  removed  from  the  rolls  by other
mchanisms. In  Guinea,  an  estimated  4245  have  been  retrenched.  In  the  Gambia,
fol'owing  a census  and staff  audit,  approximately  S350  government  employees
(including  2600  temporary  employees)  were  dismissed.  And  in  the  Central  African
Republic,  300  civil  servants  have  been  fired  so  far,  with  more  reductions  planned
for  coming  years. 9 (See  Table  4).
The  data  on  these  retrenchment  exercises  are  still  quite  preliminary,  and
in-depth  analysis  of  this  experience  is  only  nov  being  performed)1 0 It  is  thus
possible  to  offer  only  tentative  observations  on impleen  tation. One  notable
feature  of these  programs  was the  use of a variety  of techniques  to deflect
political  opposition,  minimize  the social  cost of  retrenchment,  and provide
technical  support  to  redundancy  programs.  In  Guinea  and  CAR (and  planned  for
Senegal),  for  example,  public  information  campaigns were  designed,  with  the  help
of  consultants,  to inform  governmnet  employees through  radio  broadcasts  and
newspaper  articles,  of  governmAnt intentions  vith  regard  to  administrative  and
financial  aspects  of  the  staff  reduction  programs Bank  staff  reported  positive
effects  for  these  efforts.
Teetin_
Cometency  exams  were  used  in  at  least  one  country.  In  Guinea,  competency
tests  for  sitting  civil  servants  provided  technical  criteria  to  determine  which
personnel  would  be  graded  as surplus.  Those  who passed  the  test  were  to  be
retained,  and  those  who failed  would  be  entitled  to  a  severance  package  related
to  the  length  of  service.  (They  would  not,  however,  be  able  to  opt  for  the  more
9In  faCt,  many of  the  Mechanisms  described  In  this  sectIon  have been utilized  In
combnatlon with one  nother, maklng  It  difficult  to  Isolate  the relative  utility  or Impact
of  any  singl  one.  In  Ghana. for  example, voluntary  departure  was not  stixulated
through  additonal  Incenttves:  the  'voluntary  ewaratlon  package was the  same as  for
redundant  workers, thus  providing  little  notivatlon  for  workers to  leave  of  their  own
volitlon.  At the saw  time, workers theoretically  had the optlon of  early  retirement,  but
would receive no extra  payomnts over  and above their  regular  ponslon rights.  If  they
choe  voluntary  retirooent,  however, they would roceive  the lump  sum  separatlon  payment
In addition  to  thior  pnsion.  Thus, there  were virtuaiiy  no earry rorirews  in  unana,  our
som  older voluntary  departee.  Clearly, It  was not  the nature  of  the  Individual  scheme,
but  Its  relation  to. the  other  parts  of  the staff  reduction  program that  dot-rmined  the
outcome
t 0Systematic  analysis  of  pay  and  eomloyment  reform  In  three  Bank cperatlons
(Guine,  Ghana and Gambia)ls the  subject  of  the  Africa  Technical Doepartme,t,  Publlc
Sector Managent  DivisIon study In progress,  'Pubilc  Sector Pay and Employment  Reform
In Afrlca,'  forthcoming,  1990.14
lucritive  package  offered  those  in  voluntary  departure).  Recruitment  in
subsequent  years  would  be  determined  according  to  the  new qualifications  testing,
and  the  promotion  of  employees  retained  would  follow  a  logical  procedure  coupled
vith training.  Although  the exams  were  first geared  to  university  level
standards  in  France  for  professional  level  positions,  the  requirements  were  later
relaxed  to  fit  local  capabilities.  The objectivity  and credibility  of  the
program  was  validated  by the presence  of external  consultants,  and this
apparently  enhanced  acceptance  of  the  practice.  Despite  this  acceptance  of  the
principle  of testing,  the  exercise  has  proved  to  be cumbersome  to  administer,
causing  conflict  and  delays  in the  overall  civil  service  reform  program  in
Guinea.
Personnel  Banks
Competency  testing  was  couplad  in  Guinea  with  the  creation  of  a  special
nersonnel  bank vhere those  employees  who passed  sxawv,,  but were considered
otherwiso  redundant,  were  placed  in  a  special  catelory.  These  people  remain  on
the  payroll  for  siz  months.  If  they  do  not  find  jobs,  they  are  removed  and
dismissed.  They  also  have  the  option  of  leaving  of  their  own  volition  with  a
severance  package  somewhat  less  generous  than  that  offered  to  voluntary
departes.  There  are  approximately  14,487  employees in  this  category  as  of  this
writing.  (This  figure  may  include  some  3400  public  enterprise  employees,
howevr.)  The  administration  of this  personnel  bank  has proved  exceedingly
complicated,  and  there  is  not  yet  clear  indication  that  any  of those  placed  in
the  pool  have  actually  left  government.  There  is  concern  that  this  category  of
employees  will  continue  to impose  an onerous  burden  on the  wage  bill  without
contributing  to  civil  service  productivity.  Horeover,  the  presence  in  government
of  an (officially)  idle  class  of  disgruntled  employees  may serve  to  demoralize
other  government  personnel.
Severance  Packages
Severance  payments  --  financed  by  governments  themselves  -- have  accompanied
retrenchment  programs  in  most  countries.  A comparison  of severance  provisions
is  shown  in  Table  5.  While  the  absolute  value  of  these  separation  packages  is
impossible  to  compare,  the  formulae  themse'ves  appear  to  be  relatively  generous.
These  formulae  are  mostly  embellishments  upon  the  basic  legal  obligations  of
government  to  disaissed  workers  worked  out  through  negotiations  among  various
interested  parties.  The  administration  and  the  size  of  the  severance  packages
appear  to be  among  the  most  important  determinants  of the  level  of  acceptance
of the  overall  employment  reduction  program  by  affected  employees. In  Ghana,
delays  in  the  calculation  and  distribution  of  separation  entitlement  in  the  first
year  of the reform  program  stirred  some  disruptive  opposition  among  affected
civil  servants,  for  example. Bank  staff  reported  that  protests  were smoothed
over  in  the  second  year  when  severance  payments  began  to  be  awarded  on  time.
Functional  Reviews
In  some  countries,  functional  reviews  have  provided  an  important  technical
rationale  for  employment  cuts.  (Table  3 shows  a sample  of countries  that  have
carried  out  functional  reviews).  These  reviews  are  discussed  in  greater  depth
in  Part  B  of this  paper. Their  purpose  is  essentially  to  audit  the  functions15
of  component  agencies  of  government  and  the  number  and  type  of staff  presently
carrying  them  out  in  an  attempt  to  determine  the  optimal  staffing  arrangements
for  basic  government  tasks.  Functional  reviews  are  difficult  to  administer  (they
are  usually  carried  out through  technical  assistance),  and they are time-
consuming.  Indeed,  as  is  discussed  in  detail  below,  in  the  two  cases  where  they
figured  mobt  prominently  in the  reform  progr4m  (Ghana  and  Gambia)  many  cvf  the
employment  cuts actually  took  place  before  the functional  reviews  had been
started.  Nonetheless,  it  has  been  reported  that  the  carrying  out of these
review.  even  well  into  the  implementation  of  a  retrenchment  program  provides  an
assurance  that  there  is  at least  an intention  to  pursue  staff  reductions  in a
rational,  technical,-and  just  manner.  This  assurance  has  served  to dispel
political  and  social  discontent  over  the  retrenchment  programs  as  a  whole.
Redeplonmgnt,  Retraining  and  Credit  Proarams
Bank operations  have begun to address  the issue  of  redeoloyment  of
redundant  labor  in  their  reform  programs.  Several  countries  have  put  together
programe  which  offer  training  for  jobs  in  the  informal  sector,  credit  schemes
at favorable  interest  rates  for  small  business  or agriculture,  and/or  public
works  programs. (Ghana,  Gambia,  Guinea,  and  Bolivia  offered  such  programs.)
On  a technical  basis,  these  programs  have  been  less  than  fully  successful;  in
some  instances  thetir  justification  may  be  questioned.
First,  retraining  for  informal  sector  activities  --  which  is  where  many
redundant  workers  tend  to  go,  may  be largely  irrelevant;  indeed,  the  number  of
poople  benefiting  from  training  for  carpentry  or  dressmaking  is  probably  quite
small.  In  Ghana,  for  example,  where  this  type  of  program  was  offered  through
the  Prograe  of  Actions  to  Mitigate  the  Social  Cost  of  Adjustment  (PAMSCAD),
the  demand  for  such  training  was  low. In  most  countries,  the  existent  training
institutions  are  not  equipped  to  handle  this  kind  of informal  training,  or if
the  demand  were  higher,  to  accomodate  the  number  of  trainees  that  potentially
could  result  from  massive  lay-offs  in the  public  sector. The  administrative
costs  are  high  and  the  potential  benefits  unclear.  Again  in  Ghana,  an  attempt
vas  also  made  to  provide  training  through  an  apprenticeship  program. This  was
difficult  to  organize,  however,  and  only  reached  a  limited  group.  Like  the  other
redeployment  schemes,  this program  was undersubscribed.  Credit  for small
business  and  agricultural  activities,  another  aspect  of the  program,  was  also
in  low  demand.  In  the  Gambia,  the  Institute  of  Business  Advisory  Services  (IBAS)
administered  a  similar  program  which  received  approximately  700 applications  (out
of  more  than  2000  workers  laid  off  by  the  government)  and  provided  credit  and/or
training  services  to  only  about  300  individuals.
In  Bolivia,  a public  works  program  was organized  through  the  Emergency
Social  Fund  to  provide  transitional  employment  for  dismissed  tin  mine  workers
from  COMIBOL,  the  state  mining  company  Reports  indicate  that  most  miners  did
not  take  advantage  of  these  programs,  however.  Instead,  they  sometimes  used  the
cash  payment  provided  by a generous  separation  package  to relocate  and  start
enterprises  in  the  informal  sector,  or  to  find  construction  work  elsewhere.  In
Guinea,  the Government  set  up a special  office,  BARAF,  (Bureau  d'Aide  a la
Reconversion  des  Agents  de  la  Fonction  Publique)  to assist  departing  civil
servants  in  applying  for  credit  to  finance  private  businesses.  Some  Bank  staff
fear  this  credit  program  may  have  permanently  damaged  the country's  creditsystem;  indeed,  there  are  now on the  books  large  numbers  of  loans  to  departed
civil  servants  that  have  almost  no  hope  of  being  recovered.  The  Gambia  small
business  credit  scheme for  redundant  civil  servants  did  not  fare  well  in  this
respect  either.  Its loan  recovery  rate  was 30  porcent  (as  compared  to  65
percent,  for  example,  for  an  SEC-financed  credit  scheme  with more stringent
eligibility  requirements).
This  experience  suggests  that  the  technical  rationale  for  these  programs
is  weak.  It  would  appear  that  many  civil  servants  being  retrenched  nsither  need
nor  expect  to  be  retrained  or  redeployed.  Most  go  into  the  informal  sector  for
which  therso  ^eLw  adapted  credit  schees.  It  would  be ad-inistratively  easier,
and would  probably  havi  a  more  beneficial  economic  impact,  to  simply  award  cash
severance  payments  to  departing  staff.
Another point  is  that redeployment  program  require  considerable
institutional  capacity  to  ad-inister. In  the  Gambia, the program  only  got  off
the  ground  one  and  a  half  years  after  retrenchment  had  begun.  In  Ghana,  tho  lag
tim  was  two  and  a  half  years.  In  Guinea,  the  program  began  on  the  anticipated
date,  but  proved  to  be  very  difficult  to  manage.  Typically,  there  are  a  number
of  institutions  whose  activities  must  bo coordinated  and  the  preparation
requireants  are  considerable.  Moreover,  because  existing  training  and  credit
institutions  are  inadequate,  new  aechanisms  often  are  required,  imposing
substantial  additional  costs.
Finally,  for  some countries,  the  need  for  special  mechanisms  to  rechannel
labor  into  private  markets  may  be  less  than  anticipated.  That  is,  there  is  some
preliminary  evidence  to  suggest  that  labor  absorption  has been easier  than
expocted  --  or  than  governments  typically  contend.  In  Africa.  for  example,  urban
workers  appear  to  have  moved easily  into  agricultural  activities.  In  Bolivia,
the  ability  of  the  informal  sector  to  absorb  redundant  public  sector  employees
appears  to  havo  been  considerable.  Thus,  the  technical  rationale  for  retraining
and  credit  is  further  eroded.
These  programs  do  perhaps  have  an  important  symbolic  value  to  the  extent
that  dismissed  workers  place  value  on access  to  this  kind  of  assistance,  whether
they  avail  themselves  of it  or  not.  Such  programs  thus  serve  an  important
political  function  in  defusing  potential  discontent  among retrenched  employees.
In  general,  though,  it  may  make  more  sense  to  concentrate  on  severance  packages
or generous  golden  handshakes  in  desigzing  employment  reductions  programs,  as
this  is  where  most  eployee interest  and  demand  are  focused.
Remuneration  Issues
Many of the cost-containmnt  measures  taken  have  focused  on reducing
asploymnt;  but  many steps  have  also  been  directed  at  containing  the  wage  bill
in  the  aggregate,  and at  removing  distortions  in  the overall  remuneration
structure.  These  measures  are  discussed  below.
Wase  Restraint
Wane  freezes  are  common measures.  Full  or  partial  wage  freezes  were17
called  for  in  Uruguay,  Senegal,  Gambia,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe.  Cameroon,  Gabon
and  Tunisia.  (Prior  to  the  Bank's  increased  involvement  in  wage  bill  restraint,
wage  froozes  featured  more prominently  as  conditions  of  D(F  agreements.)  Ways
of  instituting  a  wage  freeze  or  at least  restraining  wages  are  numerous;  i.*.
by  holding  wages  to  existing  levels  in  current  terms;,  by  holding  them  in  constant
ternr;  by  allowing  increases  equal  to  a  portion  of,  but  less  than  the  entirety
of  the  rate  of  inflation;  by  setting  a  currency  unit  ceiling,  or  by  agreeing  that
the  wage  bill  cannot  surpass  a particular  ratio  (for  example,  percentaps  of
government  expenditure).
Rationalization  of  Remuneration
IAcreasingly,  pay  and  employment  reform  programs  have  also  been  addressing
specific  pay  conditions  for  civil  servants  in  an  attempt  to  remove  deaotivating
distortions  in  government  remuneration  structures.  A number  of  reform  programs
have  aimed  at  improving  pay  conditions,  rationalizing  the  overall  system  of
romuneration,  and  building  an  institutional  capacity  in  government  to  formulate
*ad  implement  sound  salary  policies  on  an  ongoing  basis.
Uaticnalization  of  the  remueration  structure  has  been  an  important  reform
objective.  This  has  mainly  consisted  of  attempts  to  reduce  the  proportion  of
rommnerations  from  non.wage  benefits.  In  many  countriec,  these  constitute  an
unacceptably  large  percentage  of  total  compenation,  as  real  wages  have  been
steadily  eroded  by  inflation  and  expanding  employment.  Most  work  on  this  issue
has  boen  in  the  form  of  studies  calling  attention  to  the  problem  and  recomending
solutions.  Such  studies  are  being  carried  out  in  Senegal,  Cameroon,  Hauritania,
Senegal,  among  others.  In  several  countries,  concrete  steps  have  been  taken  to
reduce  allownsces.  Bolivia,  Laos,  Guinea,  Senegal,  and  Cameroon  have  reduced
non-wage  allowances  (housing  in  Cameroon),  in-kind  benefits  (rice  rations  in
Guinea and  special  porformance  prenia in  Bolivia.)  However,  available  data
suggest  that,  in  genoral,  virtually  no  progress  has been  made  on this  front.
As Table  6 indicates.  non-wage  benefits  as  a percentage  of total  compensation
have increased  on the average  by nearly  8 percent  for those  countries  that
experienced  a  change.
It  is  claimed  that  the  Cameroon  has  also  significantly  reduced  the  number
and  extent  of  allowances,  but  data  do  not  show  any  improvement  between  1986  and
1988. Bolivia  has  officially  taken  actions  to  reduce  benefits,  but  data  on  the
results  of  those  measures  have  not  yet  been  collected.  One  reason  for  the  slow
movement  on  this  issue  is  the  difficulty  in  getting  systematic  information  and
disentangling  the  enormously  intricate  webs  of benefit  structures.  For  many
coungries  --  in  particular,  those  in  francophone  Africa  --  it  may  well  be  that
refom will  only  result  from  a  simple  declaration  nullifying  the  entirety  of  the
present  convoluted  benefit  system,  and  replacing  it  with a rational,  salary-
based  reward  system.  Unfortunately,  it  is  politically  difficult  to  dispense  with
non-wage  machanisas  without  redressing  the  inadequacies  of  the  salary  structure
which  stimulated  the emergence  of  non-wage  distortions  in the first  place.
Bolivia's  recent  attempts  to legislate  a rational  salary  system  have  been
circumvented,  for  example,  by  spontaneous  non-wage  bonus  features  to  reward  some
employees  outside  of  the  strict  wage  system.
Equalizins  Pal  Discregancies18
Ineouities  in  pal  amont  various  parts  of  governnent  have  also  been  the
target  for  rationalization.  In  Mauritania,  salary  discrepancies  among  different
central  government  ministries  for  comparable  work,  and  the  effects  of  inequities
resulting  from  irregularities  in  employment  status,  were  both the subject  of
studies  financed  by  the  Bank's  Development  Management  Project.
Closing  the  gay  in  pay and  benefits  among  different  parts  of the  public
sector  was the goal of some  reform  programs.  In Jamaica,  and many other
countries,  parastatal  bodies  were  able  to  attract  qualified  candidates  away  from
the civil service  with substantially  higher  salaries.  SAL III instituted
conditionality  that  higher  level  management  posts in the civil service  be
remunerated  at 85 percent  of equivalent  grades  in  statutory  bodies  through  a
three-phase  pay  hike.  Although  two  raises  for  managers  did  occur,  the  opposition
to  differential  wage  increases  from  unionized  civil  servants  at lower  skill
levels  prevented  the  third  increase  from  being  enacted.  As  a  result  of  this
delay  and  the  continuing  wage  erosion  through  inflation,  qualified  professionals
and  managers  continue  to  be  in  short  supply  in  central  government. 11
Simplifting  the  Salary  Structure
In  some  countries,  simplification  of the  salary  grid  has resulted  from
pay  and  grading  study  recoamundations.  Studies  have  been  carried  out  in  Bank-
financed  programs  in  the  Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea,  DoLinica,  and  Jamaica,  for
egample.  In Dominica,  the reuneration  system,  consisting  of over  100 pay
scales,  was  converted  to a  structure  of 14 for  middle  and lower  management;
almost  all  jobs  are  now included  in  this  new  pay  scale  system.  In  Guinea,
consultants  undertook  a  job  evaluation  exercise  and  reduced  19  grades  to  12.
Wage  Compression  and  Decompression
For  many  countries,  the  erosion  of average  wages  was the  big  problem  to
be  addressed  by  pay  reform.  But,  particularly  in  Africa,  a  principal  objective
of  pay  reform  is  the  decompression  of the  wage  structure.  This  is  essential,
given  the  difficulties  in  recruitment  and  retention  of  higher  level  staff  whose
salaries  have  sunk  to  very  low  multiples  of  the  lowest  ranked  workers.  (Table
7  shows  some  compression  ratios  for  selected  countries.)  Decompression  of  the
salary  structure  was  a definite  aim  in  Ghana,  for  example,  where  in  1984,  before
the  SAC  I  program  began,  the  compression  ratio  was  approximately  2.5  to  1.  It
rapidly  moved  to  5.7:1  in  that  year  and  by  1989,  it  had  decompressed  to  7.8  to
1.  The  Government's  stated  objective  of  achieving  a 13  to  1 ratio  by  1991  may
or  may  uot  be  ,eached,  but  it  is  clearly  moving  in  the  right  direction.  In  the
CAR, five  years  of reform  produced  no perceptible  change  in the compression
it  Mothodologies  for  determining  the  appropriate  pay  levels  In  the  civIl  service
are  only  now being  developed.  In  Jamaica,  a  comparative  pay  survey  was  carrfled  out
through  the  Administrative  Reform  Project,  the  Institutlonal  counterpart  for  pay  reform
In  SA.  1il.  But  the  survey  took  so  long  to  be  cc -:leted  that  the  AMP was  terminateo
before  the  results  becm  known.  Slmilar  surveys  .- re  carrled  out  In  Ghana, the  Gambla,
and  Tlhailand  to  determine  the  approprlate  pay  levels  for  clvil  servants.19
ratio.  And  in  Laos,  salaries  decompressed  from  3  to  1  to  6 to  I  under  a  prograa
supported  (in  its  later  stages)  by the  Flnd  and  the  Bank.
For  othor  countries,  progress  is  much  less  clear.  During  the  reform  period
in  the  Gambia,  for  example,  salaries  appear  to  have  become  more  compressed  in
the  first  years  of  adjustment,  moving  from  6.5  to  1  to  5.7  to  1.. -(This  might
havo  been  due,  in  part,  to  the  introduction  of  the  'new,  shorter  twelve  grade
structure,  however.)  In  guinea  Bissau  and  Senegal,  as  voll,  it  would  also  appear
that  salaries  compressed  further  during  the  reform  period,  from  5.2 to  1 to  4
to  1  in  the  former:  to  7.8  to  1  to  6.8  to  1  in  the  latter.  It  must  be  underlined
that  all  theso  figures  should  be  taken  with  a large  grain  of  salt;  they  tend  to
be 'guess-timates',  based  on  sketchy  data.
Salary  SuDDlements
Vhere  reform  of  the  salary  structure  has  not  been mminent,  a number  of
countries  have  resorted  to interim  programs  aimed at  attracting  qualified
professionals  into  government.  Salary  suoolements  are  the  most  common  mechanism
used  to  compensate  for  low  civil  service  pay  at upper  echelons.  Although  no
systmatic  docuentation  exists,  salary  oupplements  appear  to  be  widely  utilized.
Exaples include  Mozambique,  Bolivia,  Uganda,  Guinea Bissau,  Camroon  and  Niger,
among others.  In  councries  whore  intrntational  donor  assistance  provides  an
alternativo  employment market  for  skilled  professionals,  salary  supplements  may
be  provided  by  eoternally  financed  projects  in  several  different  ways.  Civil
servants  may accept  supplements  to  top  off  their  civil  service  pay  by as  much
as  400  percent  (as  in  Mozsambique  or Bolivia),  without  taking  leave  from  the
government  rolls.  Indeed,  in  Moxambique  (and  elsewhere)  Bank  and  other  donor
projects  have  hired  individuals  working  in  ministries  to  staff  special  project
units  at  higher  salaries  while  still  retaining  their  government  Jobs.  The
obvious  conflict  of  interest  potential  here  is  enormous.  Moreover,  the
demonstration  effect  for  those  government  employees  lacking  access  to  topping-
up  benefits  can  be  devastating..
Some  c  ril  servants  may take leave or actually  separate from the civil
service.  Whi.,  this  is  a *cleaner'  arrangement  in  principle,  the  cost  may  well
be  the  loss  of  the  skilled  individual  from  government  service  over  the  short  and
long  run. In  countries  such  as  Mozambique  where  human  capital  is  so  scarce,  this
brain  drain  could  paralyze  government  functions.  Moreover,  on a large  scale,
such  supplementation  is  affordable  only  with  sustained  external  financing.  The
siphoning  off  and  rewarding  of  the  best  and  the  brightest  undercuts  government
motivation  to  improve  conditions  for  the  majority  of  individuals.  On  the  other
hand,  salary  supplements  are  viewed  by  many  BanK  Staff  as  unavoidable.  They  are
seen  as  the  only  way of  obtaining  good  staff  to  run  projects  and  programs  which,
presumably,  will  enhance  the  functioning  of  the  civil  service,  and  restart  the
process  of  economic  growth.  The argument  is  that  the  loss  of  time  and  money that
would  occur  with  inferior  staff  is  worth  both  the  higher  remuneration,  and  the
demoralization  of  the  unaffected  majority.
In  some  countries,  salary  supplements  consist  of  those  payments  provided
to  hisher  level  civil  servants  over  and  above  their  civil  service  grade  salazy.
These  payments -re offered  largely  because  it  is  feared  that,  without  topped  up20
salaries,  the  most  capable  personnel  will  be luned  into  internationally  financed
projects  or,  better-paying  parastatal,  or (where  this  is an  option)  into  the
private  sector.  There  is  little  doubt  that  salary  sLpplements  have  a  corrosive
and  distorting  effect  on  civil  service  moral&  and  management.  Host  important,
they  undermine  the  possibilities  of  meaningful  structural  reform  in  the  longer
term.  The  insidious  aspect  of this problem  is  that  in  many  instances  the
offenders  are  tho  donors,  including  the  Baik. This  is  so  despite  the  Bank's
overt  policy  of  not  financing  government  salaries.
Zn a few instances,  innovations  havo been proposed  to deal  vith this
problm.  In  Bolivia,  intornational  donors  contributed  $  U.S.  6  million  to  form
a foundation  to finance  500 key high level government  positions  --  all
performance  evaluated  --  outside  of  the  budget  and  outside  of the  Da' targets
for  the  wage bill. While  this  was  not  seen  as  a  long-term  solution  to  the  salary
problem,  it  was viewed  as a means  to  bring  som  order  to  tho chaotic  pay
suppleeont  situation.  In  Ghana,  tho Bink  assisted  an  innovative  Skills
Mobilization  Scheme to  finance  local  consultancies  for  key  government  positions
essential  to  the  economic  recovery  program.  Fees  for  these  coniultancies  were
to  be  at  local  private  sector  rates  --  well  over  civil  service  levels  --  and the
positions  were not  to  be  filled  by  serving  government  employees.  The  idea  was
to attract  skilled  professionals  from the private  sector,  and  porhaps  even
repatriate  skilled  Ghanaians  living  overseas.  After  considerable  debato  over  the
tems of  these  contracts,  the  schem was  made  operational,  but  appears  to  have
had  little  impact.  At  time  of  writing,  forty-one  individuals  have been
identified  as  eligiblo  for  the  scheme and  registered  on  a  consultants  roster,
but  only  three  government  slots  have  actually  been  filled  through  this  mechanism.
Parastatals  vs.  Central  Government
There  are  various  aspects  to  the  salary  supplemont  problem.  Attempts  to
approach  parity  betveen  central  sovernment  salaries  and parastatals  were
contemplated,  if  not  alvays  fully  carried  out,  in Jamica, Ivory  Coast and
Bolivia. Such  attempts  sometimes  result  in  a  no-win  situation.  First,  the
equalization  of state  enterprise  salaries  with those  of central  government
agencies  is  often  not  achievable;  all  that  can  be  accomplished  is  to  narrow  the
gap  between  the  two  in  order  to  stem  the  flow  of  qualified  staff  from  one  to  the
other  and to  mitigate  somewhat  the  resentmnt of  civil  servants  at receiving
relatively  lower salaries.  Second,  even in cases where  parity  has been
legislated,  the  incentives  to  performance  of  state  enterprises  themselves  cannot
help  but  be  negatively  affected.  To  the  degree  that  parastatals  behave  more  like
central  government  agencies  than  private  or  competitive  enterprises  --
particularly  vith  regard  to  salary  and personnel  policies  --  parastatal
performance  is  likely  to  suffer.
Institutional  Arrangement  Issues
The  Bank's  interlocutor(s)  in  programs  to  reduce  the  size  and  contain  the
cost  of the  civil  service  have  generally  been  the  Hinistry  of Finance  and  the
4inistry  of  the  Civil  Service.  The  tendency  of  the  Bank  to  centralize  its  socus
on these  core  agencies  has  occasionally  oversimplified  the  complicated  map  of21
institutions  involved  in  various  phases  of  cost-containment.  In  the  Ghana  case,
the  failure  to  perceive  and  bring  on  board  the  entirety  of  agencies  involved  in
the  process  resulted  in  design  mistakes  and  delays  in  impl¶mentation. 12 In  other
instances,  the  failure  to  understand  that  institutional  arrangoments  in  countries
are  more decentralizod  and  less  controllable  than  donors  would like (or  are
accustomed  to)  has  led  project  designers  to  underestimate  the  potential  for  non-
compliance  with  reform  objectives.  Again  in  Ghana,  the  exclusion  of  the  Ghana
Education  Service  from  redeployment  .discussions  contributed  to  a  misperception
of  the  chances  for  post-freeze  recruitment  of  teachers.
Internal  Bank  nrocedures  are  also  factors  affecting  the  outcome  of the
reforms  ezperiences  discussed  above. Onne  lemnt  increasingly  recognized  as
crucial  to  the  preparation  of  pay  and  employment  programs  is  diagnostic  sector
work  in  anticipation  of  and  in  conjunction  with  SAL  design.  Much of  the  uneven
progress  noted  at  various  points  in  this  paper  in  the  Ghana  reform  progrim  might
well have been mitigated  by adequate  diagnostic  work that mapped  out the
strength.  and  weaknesses  of  the  institutions  that  would  need  to  be involved  in
the  program.  An 'institutional  assessment'  of  this  type  might  have  resulted  in
a  strategy  which  established  the  objectives,  and  the  ways  to  reachx them,  of  each
step  of  the  reform  program.
4.  I?.act  of  Cost  Containment  Reform
The  above  discussion  has focused  mainl"  on aspects  of implementation  of
government  pay  and  employmnt  reforms  through  Bank  operations.  Although  a  fair
amount  can  be  determined  about  how  these programs  are working  from  this
implementational  perspective,  a  sense  of  the  real  contribution  of  these  reform
programs  can only  be achieved  by  looking  more  closely  at their  outcomes  and
trying  to assess  the degree  to which they  have  accomplished  their stated
objectives.  (Note  again  that  the  usual  warnings  obtain  about  the  limited  extent
and  low  quality  of  the  data.)
Wase  Bill  Imoact
The  primary  objective  of  most reforms  wag to reduce  the  aggregate  wage
bill. To  what  extent  has  this  occurred  in  recent  years?  Is there  any  way to
link  changes  (positive  or  negative)  in  the  wage  bill  to  Bank-sponsored  government
pay and employment  reforms?  (Table  8 shows  wage bill trends  for selected
countries).  For  the  fifteen  countries  with  available  data  in  which  either  the
Bank  -- through  a  SAL or  a  TAL --  or  an  DMP  program  sponsored  reform,  ten  (two-
thirds)  had  wage  bill  increases  for  the  last  two  years. Moreover,  this  group
included  those  countries  in  which  the  reform  program  had  progressed  furthest,
such  as  Ghana,  Jamaica,  Guinea,  and  the  Gambia.  In  only  four  countries  did  the
wage  bill  decline  in  absolute  terms.  In  nine  countries,  wages  and  salaries  rose
12A  noted  by  J.  rait  oavis In  -Revlew  and Evaluation  of  Ghana's Clvil  Servlce
Refor.  Programm,"  Consultant's Report, ATPS, World Bank, October,  1989.22
salaries  rose  as  a  percentage  of  total  expondituros.  Moreover,  the  percentage
of total  expenditures  on goods  and  services  or materials  and  supplies,  the
indicator  of  the  availability  of  necessary  inputs  for  government  staff,  declined
for  seven  out  of the  group  and  rose  only  for  four.  (For  Togo,  the  percentage
of  current  expenditures  spent  on  goods  and  services  declined  for .he  last  year
of  available  data). For  the  other  four  countries,  data  were  not  available.
To repeat,  these  data  are  not  very  robust  and it  would  not bo vise to
overgeneralize  from  them. Indeed,  there  mia  be  any  number  of  good  reasons  why
the  wage  bill  rose  in  these  countries  that  are  completely  umrelated  to civil
service refou  programs.  It is not possible to explain reliably the
idiosyncratic  reasons  for  each  vage  bill  increase.  Even  for  cases  where  it  is
possible  to  probo  data  more  deeply,  the  reasons  for  increases  in  the  wage  bill
can  be  very  ambiguous. 13 Moreover,  even  at  the  aggregate  levol,  the  time  lag
between  reform  and  impact  may  bo longer  than  can  bo  captured  in  the  available
figures.  It  is  possible  that  these  results  will  only  be  visible  1-n  future  data
sets.
It  should  also  be  noted  that  personnel  exponditure  trends  often  do  not  show
up in the  aggregate  wage bill  figures. They  can  be hidden  in the  budget  in
myriad  other  (often  non.itemized)  categories.  Thus,  som  of these  wage  bill
figures  may  actually  understate  the  total  amount  of  personal  emoluments  for  a
given  year.  Taking  all  these  caveats  into  account,  however,  the  data  suggest
that  the impact  of these  reform  programs  on aggregate  wage  bill  reduction  is
negligible.
The increase  in overall  wages  and salaries  expenditures  may be due to
general  pay  hikes  awarded  to  civil  servants  to  alleviate  the  erosion  that  had
been affecting  government  salaries  in  many  countries  --  again,  especially  in
Africa.  As  has been  pointed  out earlier  in this  paper,  this  general  wage
erosion  affected  different  classes  of civil  servants  differently,  and  higher
level  professionals  salaries  had  fallen  to  dangerously  low  levels  in  many  cases.
Thus,  the  possible  'good  newsv  in a higher  aggregate  wage bill  might  be the
decompression  of  the  salary  structure  from  top  to  bottom.
Data  on wage  compression  are  poor.  Table  7 shows  changes  in only six
cases.  Of  these,  half  the  wage  structures  showed  decompression  and  half  showed
compression.  Looking  a  bit  more  closely  at  individual  reform  programs  it  seems
clear  that  Ghana  has  made  progress  in  decompressing  its  salary  structure,  and
Bank  staff  confirm  improved  morale  among  upper  echelon  personnel.  In  the  CAR,
it  would  appear  that  not  much  decompression  has  occurred.  And  the  compression
situations  in  Guinea  ane  tho  Gambia  are  less  encouraging  still.  Deepite  reform
programs,  vages  have  actually  become  more  compressed.  In  the  Gambia,  this  is
especially  disturbing  since  a  hotly  debated  salary  increase  of  approximately  25
13  In  8u/lvla,  for  example, where ore  detailed  analytic  work has recently  been
eoapleted on pubilc sector  wage and employment  trends,  the  Increase might be explalned
by  a  rise  In  employment  (perhaps  with  declining  average  wages)  or  an  Increas'.  In
average real  salarles.  The data  for  that  country  are so ambiguous  that  It  Is ilpossible
to  argue eIther  case with confidene.  See Barbara Munberg,  80oliv/C:  A Review  of  Public
Pay and EmJioyment  Issues'  1990.23
percent  was  awarded  in  1988.
Another possible  explanation  of wage bill  incresses  m3ght be  the
rationalization  of the  romuneration  structure.  As noted,  non-wage  benefits
and  allowances  have traditionally  constitu.ed  an important  component  of the
overall  compensation  package.  These benefits  have  oftcen  been unevenl
distributed  and have  rarely  boen  linked  to  performance-based  criteria  --  or  eve
need.  In most countries  information  about these benefit structures  i
unavailable  to  policy  makers. And,  of  course,  the  more  important  the  non-wag
benefit  contribution  to  the  overall  compensation  package,  the  more  i:  is  likel
to  distort  the  general  distribution  of  remuneration,  thus  making  culculation
of compression  ratios  among  various  .evels  of the  civil  service  at.  best  onl
indicative  of  real  remuneration  relationships.
EuDlo7ment  Reductions
In the absence  of clear  improvements  on the  fiscal  side,  the overal
objective  of  employment  reduction  retains  importance.  Has  this  been  achieved
under  these  programs?  Table  9 shows  the  limited  data  available  on employment
trends  for  selected  countries  which  have undergone  some form  of employment
refosm.  For  the  fifteen  countries  for  which  data  are  available,  eight  were  able
to  reduce  goverument  employment  during  this  period. Among these,  out (Ghana)
experiencid  slippage  through  new  recruitment  in  the  Education  Service.  Two
others - Jamaica  and  Cameroon  --  experienced  significant  reductions  in  recent
Years,  but  then  reversed  the  trend  slightly  during  the  last  year. For  the  other
countriec,  the  rate  ofIrowth remained  relative4y  constant  during  the  reform
period.
In  general,  these  reductions  were  of  small  magnitude.  The  limited  impact
on the  wage bill for those  few  cases  where  results  have  been even  modestly
encouraging  may  be a function  of the  very  low  levels  of employment  cuts  that.
countries  are  besig  asked  and  are  willing  to  make. Indeed,  it  may well  be  that
more  serious  impact  can  only  be  achieved  through  more  drastic  reductions.
It  is  also  important  to  note  that  the  saving  achieved  through  government
cuts  were  generally  not  sufficient  to  pay  for  the  subsequent  salary  increases
avarded  to  correct  previous  civil  service  wage erosion. Indeed,  preliminary
evidence  from  Ghana  and  the  Gambia  suggest  that  aggregate  pay  increases  vastly
outstrip  the savings  accrued  by  the  retrenchment  exercise.  rTe discrepancy
between  the  relatively  small  fiscal  savings  of  retrenchment  and  the  generous  pay
hikes  is  partially  explained  by  the  extreme  wage  erosion  that  had  taken  place
in  many countries  in  recent  years.  It  is  not  likely  that  significant  redress
of this  erosion  could  be achieved  through  anything  less  than  massive  employee
lay-offs,  the  likes  of  which  have  not  been  contemplated  or  carried  out  in  any
of  the  present  cases.  Finally,  most  employment  reduction  has  taken  place  at  the
lower  pay  levels  of  the  civil  service.  This  has  tended  to  mitigate  the  financial
impact  of  the  redundancies.
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Short-term  efforts  te correct  glaring  and burdensome  distortions  in
government  pay and employment  practices  have clearly  dominated  the Bank's
operational  agenda  in  civil  service  reform. However,  with the  advancement  or
completion  of emergency  surgary,  many governments  --  vith Bank support  --  have
begun  to  focus  on  longer  term  issues  in  civil  service  strengthening.  The  along
view' transcends  cost-containment  to concentrate  on detailed,  slower-paced
reforms  aimed  at  improving  levels  of  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  government
administrative  systems.  The grand  objective  of  these  'rationalist'  reforms  is
to  create  or  strengthen  a  capacity  for  petsonnel  policy  formulation  and  for  day-
to-day  management  of  the  civil  service.  Underlying  the  longer-term  approach  is
the  recognition  that  shorter-term  measures  must  bo  supported  by  institutionalized
systems  that  can  sustain  ongoing  reform.
To the extent  that  development  management  iaterventions  are linked  to
policy-based  reforms,  they  may be  distinguished  from  the  oublic  administration
assistance  activities  of other  donors  working  in this  field  (particularly  the
United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  [USAID] and  the  United  Nations
Departmeat  of  Technology,  Co-operation  and  Devolopment  (UN-DTCj]).  These  latter
have  tended  to  engago  ln  eztensive,  diffuse,  training  and  improvement  programs,
often  linked  to  particular  projects,  with  little  policy  focus  and  few  links  to
precise,  measurablo,  institutional  outcomes.
In  essence,  the  Bank's  long  view,  more  rationalist'  reform  programs  aim
at:
* AAatalling-in-  civiLsorvices--personnel  information  and
management systems,  more  tightly  linked  to  payrolls,  and
including  clear  and  appropriate  career  development  schemes;
*  staff  audits,  to  determine  vhat  personnel  is  on  hand;
•  improved  training  systems;
*  revision,  usually  meaning  simplification,  of the  legal
framework  governing  the  civil  service;  and
*  getting  the  right  people  into  the  administration,  partly  by
stronger  incentives  to  attract  and  retain  them,  partly  by
changing  objectives  and  procedures  in  an  effort  to  make  the
work  situation  more  challenging  and  rewarding.
Civil  service  management  reform  has  been  dealt  with  in  a  series  of
technical  assistance  projects  of  relatively  recent  origin.  The main  activit  es
of  these  development  management  operations  are  outlined  bolow. The  discussion
then  raises  a  set  of  important  implementational  issues,  and  concludes  by  drawing
the  first  discernable  lessons  from  these  operations'  results.
Since  1981 approximately  23  TALs  have  supported  civil  service  management
reform  programs.  Most,  though  not  all,  were  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa. Host  of
the  operations  have  been  specifically  linked  to  institutional  reforms  contained
14somw  of  trese  rALs were only partalaly devoted to developaent sanaegent  Issues
and thus  cannot  be strictly  classifled  as developnt  can.gent  projects.25
in ALe  (The  remining  have  oecn  supposedly  freestanding  projects,  but  even
a  fair  number  of these  ha7e  had  an  indirect  relation  to  SAL  reform  programs.)
There  is  no formsl  model for  reform  that  can  be  applied  uniformly  across
countries,  but  there  are  identifiable  sets  of activities  which  most  of these
projects  have  in  c,imon. These  measures  are  presented  below  according  to  the
phased  order  in  wh.ch  they  usually  occur  in  the  reform  process.
1.  Comoonents  of  Rationalist  Refor-uUfiorts
Data  Collection  and  Analysis
In  the  least  developed  countries  with  weak  reporting  and records  systems,
the  first  need  is  to  determine  the  facts;  i.e.  to  determine  the  number,  personal
characteristics,  skills,  years  of  service,  pay,  etc.,  of  the  civil  service.  In
some cases,  there  has  been  a coincidence  of  this  data  collection  exercise  and
a  civil  service  census  (Mauritania,  for  instance).  In  others,  such  exercises
may  complement  or  supplant  previous  censuses  which  were  methodologically  flawed
or  did  not  go  far  enough  in  collecting  pIrtinent  information.  This  was  the  case
for  Whana and  the  Gambia,  or  example,.  '  Vhilo  tim-consuming  and  expensive,
these  data  gathering  and  analysis  exercises  provide  the  data  base  for  the
establisheat  of  effective  records  managoomt  practices.  This  means  improving
registry  procedures  and  building  systems  for  the  ongoing  collection,  aggregation
and  analysis  of  personnel  data.  Even  in  the  short  run,  a  manpower data  base  for
the  civil  service  is  essential  to  devising  and implementing  retrenchment
strategies.  They  provide  information  that  assists  in  the  determination  of
priority  areas  or  ministries  to  undergo  functional  reviews  (discussed  below),
for  example,  or they  help  establish  the  scope  for  staff  savings  in  various
employment  categories.
Introduction  of  Computerized  Payroll  Functions
Civil  service  management  improvement  programs  financed  by  the  Bank  often
have  included  support  for  the  rationalization  and  computerization  of  the  payroll
mechanism,  usually  located  in  the  Treasury  in  the  Ministry  of Finance.  (Ghana,
Senegal,  Mauritania,  Uganda are a  few examples).  In  some  cases  this
computerization  has  proceeded  on  its  own;  in  others,  the  payroll  system  has  been
linked  to  the  improved  personnel  management  data  base  discussed  above.  Explicit
links  to  the  budget  have  also  been  forged.  In  several  countries,  implementation
1  IOGhana, for  exampie. the original  1986 civil  servicoe  census and the  manpower
survey  carried  out  by the  Neadcount Committee  In  1987 to  Identify  ghost workers were
successful  In  Indicating  In  broad  terms  the  overall  numbers and distributlon  of  civil
servants,  but  were technically  flawed In  other  ways that  linited  their  usefulness  as a
imangment  tool.  For  example, the  data  were  collected  and  stored  manually, making
agregate  analysis difficult  and time-consuming;  the  population" was not clearly  defined
so that  It  was not  possible  to  tell  exactly  what the  percentage coverage or  response
was; certain  key pleces of  summary  personnel informatlon  were not  collected;  and, the
surveys  were  'one-off  exercises  with  no  provision  for  maintaining  or  updating
Informatlon.26
of this integrated  system  has  not  been carried  out, but  the  management  TALs  have
provided support for  studies to produce recommendations  and  the  technical
rationale for the implantation of such a network.  The integration of  the
personnel  data and the  payroll  and hudgetary  information  is somewhat  cumbersome
administratively  and institutionally  as it involves  the  coordination  of various
organs:  ministries of finance and civil  service, statistical institutes,
computation  centers  and technical  line  ministries  are  usually  all involved. But
comprehensive  and sustained  control over personnel  management functions  cannot
occur vithout  a  linked system.  Furthermore, the  greater the  degree  of
decentralization  of  personn_Lmanagement,  the  more  crucial  an integrated  network
becomes.  Most governments  (and  several  donors)  have  been easily  seduced  by the
appeal  of computerized  payroll systems,  but there  has been greater resistance
to the  notion  of  an integrated  payroll-personnel  management  information  system.
Functional  Reviews
Functional reviews have been a common feature of Bank-sponsored  civil
service  management  reform  efforts.  Such reviews  are in essence  organizational
audits on a sample  or selected  priority list of central government agencies.
Their  overall  aim  is  to  determine  the  appropriate  match  between  types  and  numbers
of staff,  and tasks  or functions  of government.  In adjusting  countries,  these
review  have sometimes  been hurriedly devised and rapidly implemented.  Thus,
they  have  not  always  met the  most rigorous  standards  of  productivitv  measurement.
Nonetheless, functional reviews do represent a rough, often best available,
effort  to determine  the  appropriate  number  of perionnel  and the type of skills
necessar"  to carry  out  the  organizational  objectives  of various  component  parts
of government.
To some degree,  the term, 'functional  reviev'  is a catchall  for a range
of related  or similar  activities,  includingt
0Job  Inspections  --  A job inspection  program reviews the structure  and
staffing  of agencies  in government  to determine: what work needs to be done to
fulfill  the organization's  objectives;  whether the  organizational  structure is
appropriate  for  its  activities;  whether the  staffing  numbers,  grades,  and  levels
of responsibility  are appropriate  to the  needs of the work; and, whether some
degree  of consistency  is maintained  across  agencies.
*  Orxanization and method studies constitute another instrument used in
functional  revievs.  These are evaluations  of the efficiency  of a  particular
service provided in a  similar way  by  several or many agencies, and where
significant  numbers of staff  are employed.  The aim is to identify  main areas
of weakness in performance, to find and remove bottlenecks, and, in sum, to
simplify  procedures. This process  can yield significant  staff savings  as well
as promote  greater  efficiency.
*  A  third  technique  used in functional  reviews  is  budgetary  analysis.  This
is  an examination  of financial  data in  an effort  to  pinpoint  sreas  where  manpower
are  being inefficiently  employed. This,  it  is  assumed,  automatically  identifies
potential  targets  for  budgetary  savings. One approach  is to  undertake  analysis
by  exceptions for  example,  to  pinpoint  agencies  where  the  proportion  of  personal
emoluments to  total expenditure is particularly high, or where  trends  in27
personnel  emoluments  have deviated  significantly  from  observed  trends  in  other
program  expenditure.
*  Functional  reviews  often  use ratio analysis,  a means of identifying
potential  problem  areas  requiring  more  detailed  policy  reviews.  Ratio  analysis
is  tailored  to  the  precise  functions  and  objectives  of  the  organization  or  sector
concerned.  Typical  examples  include  medical  officer/bed  ratios,  teacher/non-
teaching  staff  ratios,  agricultural  eztension  officer/population  ratios,  and  cost
of  tax  revenues  collected/tax  collector.  These  ratios  are  then  reviwed against
government  targets  to assist  in highlighting  regional  disparities  and, in
particular,  flagging  areas  of  apparent  staff  shortages  or  surpluses  relative  to
the  average.  Ratio  analysis  is  indicative  rather  than  conclusive;  it  indicates
needs  for  more  specific  policy  reviews,  and  ultimately  to  more  detailed  plans
for  recruitment,  training  and  staff  developmnt.  In the imediate, it  helps
identify  functions  which  are  obsolete,  overlapping  or  otherwise  redundant.
The findings  of  functional  reviews  lead  to  the  next  phase  in  the  sequence
of  administrative  rationalization;  the  matchina  of  existing  personnel  to  ideal
needs.  In  principle,  this  should  result  in  the  identification  and  retention  of
those  individuals  with  appropriate  and  needed  skills. It  should  also  lead  to
the reassignment  (and porhaps retraining)  of  staff  superfluous  to  the
requiremnts  of  the  agency  under  review,  but  who  possess  capacities  and  potential
required  elsewhere  in  the  system.  Finally,  it  should  identify  the  individuals
who  are  not  needed,  and  should  be  dismissed  or  porsuaded  to  leave  voluntarily.
Functional  reviews  have  been  utilized  in  several  countries  (Ghana,  Guinea,
Benin,  Gambia)  to  provide  a  technical  basis  for  decisions  concerning  employment
cuts.  Although  thQ  heavily  rationalist  process  described  above  suggests  only
an  ideal  type,  functional  reviews  of  the  sort  described  have enhanced  the
credibility  of  redundancy  programs,  in  Ghana  and  the  Gambia,  for  example. In
both countries,  as  part of the adjustment  process,  functional  reviews  were
conducted  over a period  of a few months.  They vere mainly  designed  and
administered  by international  consultants. In Ghana,  the consultants,  in
conjunction  with  British  Overseas  Development  Assistance  (ODA)  -sponsored  overseas
training,  succeeded  in  transferring  personnel  review  techniques  to  local  staff
in the  Management  Servicos  Division  of the  Office  of the Read  of the  Civil
Service  (OHCS).  The  result  was  that  a corps  of  competent  job inspectors  was
built  from  scratch.  This  successful  transfer  of  technology  turned  out  to  be  an
important  and  positive  feature  of  the  program.  It  not  only  boosted  professional
pride  in the  OHCS,  but also  extended  a sense  of Ghanaian  ownership  to  the
redeployment  program.
On th.  other  hand,  job  inspectors  were  not  the  highest  priority  among the
manpower requirements  of  the  Ghanaian  civil  service.  Presumably,  the  demand  for
these  skills  will  diminish  considerably  --  though  not  disappear  --  once  the
initial,  cost-cutting  phases  of  the  redeployment  program  have  been  completed.
In  the  Gambia,  by  contrast,  virtually  no  on-site  training  of  local  staff  was
accomplished  by  the  implementing  consultants  in  the  execution  of  functional
reviews.  The  consultants  attributed  this  admitted  deficiency  to  a  number  of
factors,  including  intense  pressure  to  produce  the  reviews  very  quickly.2S
It is  worth  noting  that  in  both  the  Ghanaian  and  Gambian  cases,  a
substantial  number  of  employment  cuts  (and  certainly  those  effected  in  the  first
months  of  tho reform  programs)  were  made  izn advance'  of the  findings  of  the
functional  reviews.  However,  these reviews  did, reportedly,  help  in  the
justification  and  implementation  of  the  second  round  of  cuts.  The  reason  is
as  followst  the  second-round  targeted  reductions  fell  on  areas  of  less  obvious
'fat, and tho  data and recomendations  of the functional  reviews  provided
decision-makers  vith  'technical'  and 'objectivoe  information  with which to
contest  the  various  groups  opposed  to  the  staff  cuts.  In  Senegal,  a  process  akin
to  the  functional  reviws .-  called  organizational  audits  --  .vs  carried  out  by
the  Office  of  Organization  and  Methods  (BOM),  a  management  training  and  trouble-
shooting  unit  located  in  the  prestigious  Office  of  the  President. The  audits
of DOM  have  progressed  such  more  slowly  than  thoso  performed  by consultants.
perhaps  in  part  because  of  difficulties  in  winning  the  cooporation  and  support
of  key  ministries  in  the  eandeavor.  While  there  is  an  advantage  to  the  national
control  of the  Senegalese  exercise,  one  must  note  the  cost  of  the  suail?s  pace
at  which  policy  actions  stewLing  from  these  review have  materialized.
Trainina
In-service  training  of  civil  servants  either  on-the-job,  or  in  short
courses  abroad  have  been  a  feature  of  a  number  of  civil  service  management
projects.  ra  several  cases  (Malaiw,  Mauritania)  the  main  focus  of  projects  has
beon  on  strengthening  civil  sorvice  training  institutes.  Zn  Mauritania,  a
"training  needs  assessment'  study  was financed  through  the  Development  Management
Project,  and  a  twinning  arrangement  was  established  between  the  Institute  of
Public  Admi44stration  in  France  and  the  National  School  of  Administration  (ENA)
in  Mauritania  to  carry  out  in-service  training  of  higher  level  civil  service
personnel.  The experience  has  been  promising.  EA  --  once  a  stale  institution
focused  exclusively  on  preoservice  training  for  new  civil'  service  recruits  --
has  turned  its  attention  to  improving  the  skills  of  government  personnel  already
in  service.  Training  in  thus  serving  to  reinforce  government's  commitment  to
improve  quality  and  reduce  quantity  in  the  civil  service.
In  Malawv,  the  sale  focus  of  an  Institutional  Development  Project  is  the
training  of  higher  and  middle  level  managers  in  the  civil  service. Increasing
the  modest  national  capacity  for  management  training  has long  been  viwed by
Government  as  an  extremely  high  priority. This  view  has  come  to  be shared  by
the  Bank,  which  has  attributed  recent  implmentation  bottlenecks  in  adjustment
programs  to  the  severe  shortage  of  trained  personnel  in  the  upper  levels  of  the
civil  service.  Thus,  the  project  aims  at  the  strengthening  of  the  Malawian
Institute  of  Management.
Involved  Bank  staff  view  this  project  as a  necessary  component  to  civil
service  management  improvement.  Still,  they  are  quick  to  point  out  that  training
and  skills  improvement  are  necessary  but  not  sufficient  conditions  for  reform.
The  crucial  fact  remains  that  there  are  few  incentives,  financial  or  otherwise,
for  newly trained  and presumably  improved  managers  to return  to the civil
service.  Thus,  the  next  and  necessary  step  vill  be  to  pursue  improved  personnel
policies,  incentive  systems,  pay and employment  schemes,  and  performance29
evalustion.  Host of the  work  on  the  project  to  date  has  been  done  under  a
Canadian  twinning  oxercise  which  has  worked well  as a model for  building  training
capabilities.
Special  Incentive  Schemes  for  Biiher  Level  Civil  Servants
Weak incentives  systems  mean weak  civil  services.  As  discussed  earlier,
'topping-up'  mochanisms  that  circumvent  civil  service  salary  scales  have  been
seen  as  a  possible  answer. They  are  used  to  attract  and  retain  highly  skilled
professionals  into  government  service,  in  particular  so  they  may  perform  key
economic  recovery  program  tasks.  Topping-up  mechaniss  were  explicitly  funded
in two  TALS:  tho  Bolivia  Economic  Management  Strengthening  Operation  (EMSO)
funded  a  non-govermental agency  --  a  'foundation'  --  to  channel  pooled  extra-
budgetary  rosources  for koy posts; and the Ghana Structural  Adjustment
Institutioal  Support  (SAIS) project  created  a Skills  Hobilization  Scheme  to
hire local  consultants  for government  positions  at salaries  well over  civil
sorvice  levels.  These  schemes  were  aimed  at creating  something  akin  to  the
establishod  and enduring  U.S. Sonior  Executive  Service.  While they have
succeeded  in  getting  some  skilled  poople  into  government  service,  they  have  so
far boon  seen  as short-term,  incentivo-boosting  mechanisms,  not as  enduring
institutions.  Such  instruments  bave  been  included  in development  management
projects  in  an  attempt  to  impose a modicum  of  order  on the  haphazard  array  of
aechanisus  creatod  by  govor  iuts  (and  often  suppetted  by  donors)  to  circumvent
civil  service  remuneration  constraints.
Policy  Studies
Studies  aimed  at  providing  a technical  data  base  for personnel  policy
formulation  have  been  an  important  component  of  many  civil  service  reform
operations.  Development  management projects  have  financed  studies  to  examine
current  practices  and  reoa  mnd  future  actions  on:  salary  policy,  personnel
management  information  system  creation  and  maintenance,  general  employment
policy,  civil  service  training,  and  career  development  for  civil  servants.  A
numboer  of  studies  have  focussed  on  important  but  poorly  understood  topics,  such
as  the  system  of  fringe  benefits  and  bonuses  in  Senegal.  Host  of  these  studies
were intended  to produce  action  programs  specifying  the  needed  and feasible
steps  of  further  reform.
It  has  been  argued  that  studies  have  sometimes  substituted  for  or  delayed
action,  as  in  Bolivia  and  Senegal  for  example. The  idea  is  that  the  Bank  and
governments  use  studies  to  avoid  bringing  a  conflict,  or  potential  conflict,  to
a  damaging  head. This  cynicism  is  not  entirely  justified,  however;  studies  have
often  produced  serious  thought  about  important  and  contentious  personnel  issues,
including  what is  the  appropriate  and  affordable  role  for  state  agencies,  and
what  is  the  proper  size  and  cost  of  the  civil  service. Studies  have  supplied
recommendations  that  form  the  concrete  basis  for  Bank-country  dialogue  on  these
topics.
2.  Implementation  Issues  and  Lessons  in  Development  Hanasement30
Although  many  of the  activities  discussed  in the  preceding  section  have
just  begun  to be  impl-emented,  several  issues  meriting  attention  have  already
emerged.  The discussion  that follows  highlights  t4v  key  points;  those raised
most  frequently  by Bank  staff  working  on these  projects.
One perhaps  unavoidable  but nonotheloss  worrisome  feature  of these
development  management  operations  is  the  short-term  perspective  on  which  they
are  based;  i.e.,  tho  quite  limited  eztent  to  which  they  have  begun  to address
the longer-torm  management  Issues.  As noted,  the bulk of supported  activities
assists  SAL cost-containment  messures.  The emphasis  on the short-term  is
understandable  but  costly. It  often  comes  at  the  expense  of  attention  to  long-
term  strategy  and  the  need  to  build  enduring,  sustainable  management  systems.
In  Ghana,  for  example,  with  the  exception  of  preparing  job  inspectors  to  carry
out  tasks  in  support  of the  retronchment  exercise,  little  training  to  build  up
basic  ad4mnistrative  skills  of  the  civil  service  has  yet  taken  place.  In  Guinea,
the  prime  goal  of  TAL I  was to reduce  numbers  in  the  civil  service. So far,
there  has  been  little  support  for  the  resolution  of  longer-term,  structural  wage
issues.  A census  of  the  civil  service  was  performed,  but  there  has  not  yet  been
a follow-up  to build an iafomation management  system  to install  modern,
impartial  personnel  review  and  control  practices.  In  the  Gambia,  the  follow-up
staff  inspoction  program  which  was  to  be  carried  out  by  trained  Gambians  under
the  supervision  of  ODA long-term  technical  advisors  in  the  post-retrenchment
period  has  ground  to  a  halt,  possibly  due  in  part  to  this  failure  to  internalize
these  activities  in the  earlier  phases  of the  reform  process,  and  to  the  lack
of  comitment to  long-term  administrative  reform  by  both  government  and  the  Bank.
As noted,  in  several  instances  computerized  data  management  systems  have
been  installed  for  personnel  records  and  these  systems  have  been  linked  to  the
payroll  and the budget.  This is an accomplishment.  But the.  absence  of a
strategic  framework  for  ongoing  civil  service  management  is  troublesome.  In  the
Central  African  Republic,  for example,  concerns  have been expressed  about
inadequate  attention  to  factors essential  to  civil service performance
improvementst  career  development,  training,  incentive  structures,  performance
evaluation  sywtems,  etc. The  fear  is  that  unless  such  changes  are  implemented,
even  a  smaller  civil  service  will  remain  unproductive.  The  fundamental  questions
are  the  long-term  onese  What  kind  and  size  of  civil  service  does  the  country
need?  How should  lt  plan  to  get  there?  What  should  be the  ultimate  purpose
of the reviews  of the various  legal  texts regarding  the wage system,  the
indmiity  system,  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of  civil  servants  over  the  long
haul?
The absence  of  a  strategy  has  not  always  been  due to  the  overriding  nature
of  short  term  SAL  demands  or  the  assumption  that  cost  containment  is  everywhere
and  always  the  first  priority. In  somw  Lnstances  it  has  been  due  to  a  deficit
of  vision  or  coherence  in  the  reform  program  itself. In  Jamaica,  for  example,
the  Administrative  Reform  Project  consisted  of  a  series  of  largely  uncoordinated
activities  --  including revision  of classification  systems  and  pay  surveys  --
the  strategic  value  of  which  was  not  clearly  defined.31
There  have  been  cases  in  which  aversion  to strategic  considerations  was
the  product  of  conscious  choice. In  Bolivia,  creating  a  pool  of  comparatively
skilled  and  well  paid  civil  servants,  to fill key government  posts,  was
accomplished  --  without  enormous  difficulties  --  through  the  Economic  Management
Support  Operation  (EHSO).  But  government  interest  in larger  policy  questions
(or  even  studies)  on such  questions  as overall  pay  and  employment  levels,  or
career  development  policies,  was  conspicuously  absent.  According  to  observers,
gove-ment  reticence  could  be  traced  to  the  political  implications  of  personnel
policy  reform: the  rationalization  of  civil  service  incentives  and  employment
policies would  eliminate political patronage opportunities  which  are
alternatively  distributed  to  the  'ins'  and  'outs'  during  electoral  transitions.
There  is  thus  no  clear  constituency  for  restructuring  the  system.
In some cases,  strategic  policy  concerns  have been crowded  out by
components  the  usefulness  of  which  is  more  iimediately  apparent  to  governments.
In  Mauritania,  for  example,  computerization  of  the  personnel  management  system,
which  enjoys  considerable  governmant  comsitment,  has  been  proceeding  on  schedule.
But  a  number  of  delays  have  taken  place  in  the  preparation  of  a  series  of  policy
studies. It  may  be  that  changes  in  administrative  technology  are  perceived  as
less  threatening  politically  than  overt  examination  of  existing  policies  (even
though  the  application  of  the  technology  may  render  transparent  abuses  and  fraud
by  exposing  'ghost'  workers  and  double  salaries,  etc.)
Zfforts  in  these  operations  have  concentrated  on  reforming  systems  in  the
core  ministries  of finance  and civil service.  The costs and benefits  of
establishina  clear  linkages  between  central  ministries  and  decentralized  orians
have  not  been  well  addressed.  In  the  Jamaica  Administrative  Reform  Project,  for
e-aple,  decentralized  personnel  units  were  to  be  set  up  in  line  ministries  to
coordinate  with  the  central  Ministry  of  the  Public  Service.  Nowever,  training
of sectoral  ainistry  staff  never  occurred,  as the  central  ministry  was loathe
to  relinquish  control  of  personnel  administration.
The  question  of  sapropriate  technoloi'  and  the  capacity  of  borrowers  to
internalize  new  management  systems  and  procedures  has  been  an  issue  in  several
civil  service  management  operations.  Ghana  and Mauritania  provide  two
contrasting  experiences  in  this  regard.  In  Mauritania,  computerization  of  the
personnel  management  system  occurred  through  the  application  of  a  technical
package  that  was  developed  through  elaborate  fine-tuning  by  Tunisian  consultants,
contracted  through  a twinning  arrangement  between  their  government  and the
Ministry  of  the  Civil  Service.  Intensive  interaction  over  a  period  of  many
months  resulted  in a  system  neatly  tailored  to  the  Mauritanian  context.
Mauritanians  were carefully  trained,  and  by  the  end  of  a  year,  were  ready  to  take
over  the  system.  Bank  staff  report  that  the  twinning  approach  worked  so  well
in  Mauritania  because  of  the  cultural  affinity  between  the  Tunisians  and  the
Hauritanians;  and  because  the  Tunisians  had  just  lnstalled  a  similar  system  in
their  own  country.  From  the  outset,  this  system  was  designed  to  be
comprehensive,  connecting  the  payroll  and  the  personnel  records  of  the  Ministry
of  the  Civil  Service.  The design  of  a  comprehensive  system  grow  out  of  a
detailed  diagnostic  study  undertaken  as  part  of  Bank sector  work  on public  sector
managemnt  in  Mauritania.  Adequate  preparation,  detailed  diagnosis,  appropriate
technology,  sensitively  delivered:  these  are  the  building  blocks  of  success.32
In  Ghana,  by  contrast,  the  link  between  tha  computerized  payroll  system  -
- completed  early  in  the  adjustment  program  because  of  its  importance  to  demand
management  --  and  a  proposed  computerized  personnel  management  system  came  as
en  afterthought.  Where  the  Tunisians  had  carefully  crafted  a package  for the
particular  needs  of  the  Mauritanians,  the  expatriate  consultants  working  in  Ghana
proposed  an off-the-shelf-technology,  estimated  to take only six  months to
install.  The  establishment  of  the  linkage  is,  at  time  of  writing,  underway;  and
it  may  well  work. Still,  it  seems  likely  that  there  vill  be  A tradeoff  between
speed  of installation  and  the  degree  of  internalization  among  Ghanaians.
Tho simple  and obvious  lesson  to be drawn from these contrasting
experiences is  that  dilferent circumstances dictate different approaches.
Hauritanis  was ready  from  the outset  for a comprehensive  approach,  in part
because  of  earlier  diagnostic  work  and  in  part  becauso  of  the  good  will  towsad
the  Tunisian  consultants.  Although  successive  changes  in the  MLinister  of the
Civil  Service  created  discontinuities,  the  degree  of  consensus-building  necessary
amog various  parts  of  government  to  win support  for  tho  project  was  relatively
modest. Ghas presented  a  much  more  fractious  and  fragmented  contest,  in  which
each  step  of  the  reform  program  had  to  be  sold  to  a  videly  diverse  constituency.
It  is  unlikely,  given  the  initial  resistance  to  reform,  that  the  Ghanaians  would
have  'bought"  a  comprehensive  personnel  system  as  part  of  a  grand  civil  service
reform  strategy  so  early  in  the  reform  program.  Indeed,  a  good  deal  of  the  work
of  the  consultants  in  Ghana  --  which  overall  has  been  performed  quite
successfully  .-  has  been  gradually  to  gain  the  confidence  of  their  counterparts
and  thereby  build  support  for  the  reform  program.
The  relationshin  betwega  develonment  mnaszement  efforts  in  TALs and  SALs
is  an  issue  raised  by  Bank  staff.  Many  complained  that  SALs pushed  these
developDnt  management  operations  too fast.  Most  estimated  that  the  time
officially  allocated  for  activities  vas  about  half  of  what  was  actually  required
for  implement4tion.  The  other  horn  of the  dileia  is  that  TALs  not  linked  to
SAL conditionality  were  viewed  as 'toothless,'  and implementation  of these
freestanding  projects  was  made  that  much  more  difficult.  Thus,  in  civil  service
reform  the  Bank  seems  faced  with  a  difficult  trade-off  between  realistic,  longer-
term  timetables  and  leverage.
In a number  of instances,  the sequencint  of reforms  throuth  TALs  was
haphazard.  Sometime,  a  component  could  not  proceed  because  an  unrelated  aspect
of the  TAL or the companion  SAL would be  delayed,  thus  holding  up loan
effectiveness  or  disbursement.  This  sometimes  seriously  threw  the  phasing  of  the
civil  service  reform  items  off-balance.  In some instances,  sequencing  of
activities  had  to  be  altered  because  the  time  required  to  build  consensus  among
key actors  had been seriously  underestimated. In other  cases,  the Bank's
understanding  of  tho  network  of  principal  institutional  players  was inadequate.
in  at  least  one  instance  support  for  a  component  was aistakenly  negotiated  vith
the  wrong  agency.
The  relationship  between  the  Bank  and  other  donors  has  figured  importantly
in  development  management  operations.  Other  donors  such  as  the  UNJDTCD  and  USAID
have  been  active  on  these  issues  in  a  number  of  countries  in  which  the  Bank  is
supporting  civil service  reform.  (Guinea,  Ghana,  Bolivia  and Uganda are
examples).  The  lack  of coordination  or a clear  division  of labor  among  these33
efforts  has  resulted  in  overlapping  or  conflicting  agendas,  where  there  should
be  complementarity.  Lack  of  agreement  about  terms-of-reference  for  consultants,
operating  schedules  and  styles  has  presented  problems  --  with  varying  degrees
of  seriousness  --  in  Jamaica,  Gambia  and  Ghana,  for  example.  Delays  in  project
impl  ementation  have  ensued.
The  familiar  lament  that  staff  weeks  for  supervision  were inadeLuate  to
imolementation  requirements  was particularly  poignant  for  theso  operations.  This
was  true  for  Bank  staff  time  and  for  expert  consultancies.  For  some  aspects  of
dewelopment  management,  such  as  the  computerization  of  payroll  and  personnel
records  schemes,  specialized  skills  have  to  be  sought  outside  the  Bank;  but  in
several  cases,  resources  were  not  available  and  therifore  generalist  Bank  staff
were  forced  to  superviso  --  often  inadequately,  thel,  felt  --  highly  technical
components. 
3.  Observations
What  the  above  diseussion  of  experience  suggests  is  that  this  group  of
doevlopment  managemnt  operations  constitute  a  first  generation  of  projects  whose
objectives  are,  for  the  most  part,  tied  to  the  overall  agenda  of  SALs. As  such,
they  have  only  begun  to  scratch  the  surface  of  what  is  required  to  construct  (and
sometimes  reconstruct)  well-managed  and  well-performing  civil  services.  Indeed,
for  the ost  part,  Bank  lnterventions  in  this  area  have  left  untouched  a  wide
range  of  longer-term, structural issues whose  resolution is essential to
sustainable  improvements  in  government  administrative  capacity.  These  include
the  reform  and institutionalization  of  systems,  procedures  and,  most  importantly.
incentive  structures.  This  study  shows  that  as  the  shorter-term  reforms  are
played  out,  the  need  to  affect  these  underlying  systemic  problems  through  second
and  third  generations  of  projects  is  becoming  more  evident,  as  is  their
complexity.  The uncertain  and  sometime  apparently  intractable  nature  of  these
issues  has  already  felled  one  successor  administrative  reform  project  in  Jamaica,
where  tho Bank  is  now  pursuing  a  more  narrow  approach  to iastitutional
development  through  a  financial  management  project  to follow  upon the  first
Administrative  Reform  Project.
A key  conclusion  is  that  avoiding  civil  service  management  problems  will
not  make  them  go  away.  Some  staff  argue  that  the  inherently  complex  and
uncertain  nature  of  civil  service  reform  places  the  field  outside  the  Bank's
comparative  advantage.  They argue,  or  hope,  that  on  this  issue  the  Bank  should
confine  itself  to  assisting  in  the  definition  of  economically  rational  policies;
i.e.,  tho  appropriate  and  affordable  size  of  the  wage  bill. But  it  is  wishful
thinking  to  believe  that  one  can  separate  the  formulation  of policy  from  its
implementation.  For  prime  example,  the  Bank cannot  simply  identify  X thousand
surplus  personnel,  and  then  assume  that  the  totality  of  the  job  of  removing  them
will  be  carried  out  by  the  government  or  a  bilateral  donor. The  challenge  for
the  Bank  is  to  design  projects  which  have  measurable  short-run  cost-containment
outputs,  but  to  do  so  in  the  context  of  a  strategy  to  solve  the  more  fundamental
management  problems  in  the  long  run.34
Part  Ct  Conclusions
Despite  the  oft-mentioned  data  constraints  affecting  the  subject  and  the
findings  of  this  paper,  some  lessons  to  guide  present  and  future  civil  service
reform  are  emerging.  These  can  be summarized  as follovs:
*  The impact  of Bank  grograms  to  contain  the  cost  and  size  of  civil
services  through  emergency  pay  and  employment  reforms  has  so  far  boen  negligible.
Zfforts  in  mest countries  to  reduce  the  wage  bill  and  to  decrease  the  number  of
civLl  service  employees  have  yielded  minimal  results. Moreover,  attempts  to
correct  distortions  in the structure  of  pay and employment  through the
decompression  of  wages and  the  rationalization  of  the  remuneration  system  have
had  but  limited  success.  This  disappointing  record  suggests  that  reforms  to  date
have  been  insufficiently  ambitious  in  scope  to  bring  about  the  degree  of  change
that  is  needed.  Meaningful  change  is  going  to  require  more  forceful  reforms.
- The  question  of  whether  more  aggressive  reforms  are  feasible  is  partly
a technical  but  mainly  a  political  issue. As  mentioned  in  earlier  sections  of
this  paper,  the  political  *conomy  of  pay and  employment reforms  needs  further
conceptual  and  analytical  work. Nonetheless,  it  is  possible  to  hypothesize  from
the  few  *xamples  of  countries  where  programs  have been  carried  out  that  the
political  costs  of  implementing  pay  and employment  reforms  have  been  lower  than
most  governments  (and  perhaps  even  the donors)  had anticipated. Organized
opposition  to reforms  has  not resulted  in regime  destabilization,  and social
upheaval  as a  result  of  dismissals  has  not  occurred.  In  part,  this  may have  been
a  function  of  the surprising  capacity  of  private  sector  labor  markets  --
particularly  In agricultural  and informal  sectors,  and  particularly,  but  not
exclusively  in  Africa  --  to  absorb  surplus  government  workers.  It  may  also  have
been  a  function  of  the  unexpectedly  good  handling  of  political  factors,  including
the skill  with which regimes  generated  supporting  coalitions  and managed
contesting  groups,  for  example.
What this suggests  is that.quite  possibly  regimes  can (for  political
reasons)  and  must (for  economic  reasons)  make  deeper  cuts. How  far  any  given
government  can  push  these  reforms  is,  of course,  unknown. But  the  relatively
mild  consequences  of  the  minimal  reforms  undertaken  so  far  can,  it  is  hoped,
influence  governments'  Derceptions  of  political  risk  and  encourage  them  to  take
bolder  actions  in  the  future.
*  Most of  the middle-range  employment  reduction  mechanisms  such  as
voluntary  departure  schemes  and early  retiremnt  programs  may  be useful  and
politically  astute,  when  applied  in  combination  with  more  stringent  retrenchment
measures.  But  they  have  not  yet  proven  to  be  effective  in  reducing  employment
in  any significant  manner.  Thus,  they  do  not  providE  a  substitute  for  biting
the  bullet  through  explicit  dismissals.
*  Technical  analysis  and  support  activities  such  as functional  reviews
and  competency  testing,  for  example,  have  been  useful  in  providing  a  rational35
basis  for  cost-containment  measures.  Their  major  contribution,  however,  !ay  be
the  symbolic  assurance  they  provide  that  the  reform  process  has  been  undertaken
with  fair  and  equitable  intantions.
*  Retraining,  redeployment,  credit  and  public  works  programs  for  redundant
employees  have  certainly  had  a  utility,  but  one  more  symbolic  and  political  than
economic. From  a  financial  and  technical  perspective  such  programs  have  had
limited  impact  and  have  proved  administratively  difficult.
*  Som Bank  supported  reform  programs  have  promoted  interim  solutions  to
pay  and  employmnt  problems  through  specialized  incentive  schemos  for  topping
up executive  level  salaries  for  key  goverment  posts,  or,  more  broadly,  by  widely
supplementing  civil  service  salaries  through  donor  financed  activities.  Most
observers  familiar  with  the  use  of  these  mechanisms  recoaize  thoir  liitations
and  costs.  The problem  is  that  noither  hard-pressed  governments  nor  operational
staff  have  alternative  means  as  their  disposal.  Still,  what  must  be  recognized
is  that  these  salary  supplement  methods  do  not  provido  enduring  answers  to  the
fundamntal problems  of civil service  incentives;  indeed,  they ultimatsly
undermine  the  likelihood  of  devising  a durable  solution. The  Bank  should  not
encourage  or  support  such  mechanisms  in  the  absence  of  an action  strategy  for
long-term  structural  reformas  in  government  pay  and  employment  policies.
*  Most Bank activities  in civil service  reform  have concentrated,
understandably,  on  the  short-term  cost-containment  masures. Considerably  more
ephasis  will  have to  be  given  to  longer-term  management  issues  if  sustained
improvee  nt  in  government  administrative  capacity  is  to  take  place.  The  first
generation  of  development  management  projects  now  underway  have  taken  an
important  step  in  this  direction.  More  attention  needs  to  be  paid  to  devising
a  coherent,  over-arching  strategy  for  civil  service  reform,  and  detailing  the
set  of  tactics  by  which  the  strategic  goals  will  be  achieved.
*  Technical  Assistance  Loans  dealing  with  civil  service  management  issues
require  more  staff  supervision  time  and  more  resources  for  specialized  expertise
than  has  previously  been  allocated.  Most  estimsates  suggest  that  these  factors
need  to  be  more  or  less  doubled  to  ensure  successful  implementation.
*  Technical  Assistance  Loans  in  Development  Management  require  more  time
to  prepare  and  implement  than  do  infrastructure  projects.  While  this  is  well-
recognized,  they  are  too  often  short-changed  in  this  regard  by  their  dependence
on  both  the  scheduling  and  substantive  requirements  of  structural  adjustment
lending.  On the  other  hand,  such  TALs profit  from  the  association  with  both  the
policy  focus  and  the  increased  leverage  that  SALs  provide.  Without  SALs,  many
civil  service  reforms  in  TALs have  no  'teeth'.
*  Many of  the  institutional  obstacles  to  carrying  out  vitally  needed
civil  service  reforms  can  seem  overwhelming  and  insuperable,  especially  when
confronting  the  'long-haul'  problems.  Indeed,  the  mixed  record  so  far  on  many
of  these  issues  could  discourage  further  efforts.  A frequently  observed  response
to  this  state  of  affairs  has  been  to  decry  the  Bank's  lack  of  'comparative
advantage'  in  this  field. But  a  retreat  from  civil  service  management  reform
is  tantamount  to  a  denial  of  the  crucial  importance  of  government  administrative
capacity  to  implement  economic  and  social  programs.  A more  realistic  approach36
is  to  try  to  learn  through  trial  and error  haow  to  make such programs  vorli  better.37
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Gambia  1982  11.93  88.07
1983  12.24  87.76
1984  12.63  87.37
1986  15.65  64.35
1987  20.57  79.43
1988  21.88.  78.12
Sonegal  1980/85  25.37  74.63
1988  44.86  55.14
1989  43.00  57.00
__CA&u---------  -- i984  38.00  62.00
1985  40.00  60.00
1986  43.00  57.00
1987  41.00  59.00
Cameroon  1967  19.00  81.00.
1987/88  19.00  81.00
Bolivia  1982  70.00  30.00
Laos  90.00  10.00
Sources:  Country  staff,  Scaff  estimates,  Coopers  & Lybrand  report
'Efficacsie  de  La Fonceion  Fublique  Pro5raiwe  d. Reduction"
(Senegal).  Daca provided  by  the  CGablan  authorities.43
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Cameroon  Eco  Mgt  Ln  3110  89,07  9.00
Proj  ect
Carnroon  SAL  Ln  2866  89/07  70.00
Thailand  SAL  I  Ln  2097  82/03  104.50
Thailand  SAL 11  Ln  2256  83/03  175.50
Bangladesh  PA  Cr  1349  83/04  12.00
Bangladesh  IPC  13  Cr  1655  86/02  200.00
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Bolivia  Eco  M5t  Cr  1977  88/12  9.70
scrcnpkleuing
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Annex S:  Sox"
CIVIL  SERVICE COSt CONAIMENt
Containing  :he  concral  governmencts  wage bill ho- been a  prar-y
objeccive  of civil  service  reform  in che  Central  Aft tan Repubilc  (CAR)
and  Chan&.  :n both countries  reform  has been supported  by structural
adjustment  lending  and  technical  assistance  from the  World Bank  Group.
In the  CAR, where  the  vage  bill absorbs  over  60% of domestic
revenues,  initial  seeps focussed  on disposing  of Ighostm  workers  and
then limiting  the tocal  numbors  employed. However,  this approach  did
nee  vork well because  agencies  replaced  low-paid  workers  by roc:uicing
isaff  ac higher levels,  :c  was then  decided  co Impose  a limit  on  the
wage bill In 1987.  with further  reductions  ln 1988 and 1989.  This was I
to  be done  mainly  by suspending  regular  annual  incromencs.  The wage 
bill has, In facc,  declined  only slighcly  in each  of the first  tvo
years  (1987-1988).  Atention  is  now also  boginning  to focus  once
more on  reducing  the  size  of tho  civil service.
Reform  in  Ghana began  with  tho  eliminaicon  of  what the  governoent
has claimed to to  be some 11000  'ghosts'from  the  government  payroll.
managemont  appraisalsO  were  then  undertaken  by  teams  of officials
from  che  ministries  under  review  to  identify  categories  of workers
that  vere  overstaffed,  without  reference  co individuals. The
appraisals  concentrated  4n  the  30.40  lowest  pay  grades  (out  of 130)
on  che assumption  that chis  was where  the  main  problem  lay.  and
recommendations were made as co che  number  of  posicions  to  be
abolished.  The  recommendacions  were reviewed  bv a  committee  of
sonior  civil  servants  which  decided  how  many,  and  who,
should  be recrenchod. Ministers  chen reviewed  the  circu-sances of
each  one  of  che individuals  recommended  for  cermination,  taking  ineo
account  noc  only  thair  performance,  but  their  years  of  service  and
number of  dependencs,  as  well  as  whether  ochor  membors  of  the  family
were  governoenc  employees  and  were  also  being  ctrminated.  Only
after  this  scrutiny  were  people  actually  dismissed.  The  noc result
has  been  a  reduction  of  contral  governmenc  employmenc In  che range
of 30,000  plus over four  years.  However,  chis  has  noc yet led  co anv
budgecary  savings  because  there  has  been a general (and  badly needed)
increase  in  civil  service  pay  adjusted  for  inflation,  cogecher  wich
a  slighc  widening  of differentials  betoven  the  highest  and  lowest
paid,  and  because  savings  from  staff  reduccions  have  beon  more  chan
offset  in  the  first  chroe  years  by  che coscs  of  componsation.
The  racto  of  the  central  government  wage bill  co  GOP (around  5%)  has
in facc Incroased  slightly.50
&.L  civil  servancs  in  the  CAR  were  given  che  option  of  Leavin%
govrrnment  emplovuenc with  A severance  paymenc  of  40 moncns'  curr-n:
salary,  plus  any  personal  concribucions  they  had  made  to  che  pension
plan  (to  date  these  payments  have  averaged  over  US$10,000  per  head).
AS of Augusc  1989,  about l.500  peoplo  had applied  for  voluntary
retiremont  under  chis  scheo, and  300  had  accually  left  che  service.
IMenwhile,  plans  for  che  dismissal  of  redundant  employoes  are
procoeding  very  slowly. Those  noe  desinated as essential  by  their
agoncy  enter  a  cencral  personnel  pool,  and  may  be  hired  by  ocher
agencies  if  they  have  appropriate  qualifications.  Those  noc  selected
In  either  round  are  supposod  to  be  dismissed  from  tho  service  on  terms
much Less  favorable  than  for  voluntary  retirement,  but  wich  some
assiscance  in  obtaining  alcornacive  employment  and  access  to  credit
to  sec  up  in  business  or  farming.  However,  no  dismissals  have  yet
taken  place.
In  Ghana  each dismissed  civil  servant  receives  four  monchs  base
salay, plus  cwo  maonchs'  pay  for  each  year  of  service,  and  the
average  severance  package  for  chose  teorminaced  through  mid-1989  has
boon  estimated  cc  the  equivalenc  of  2.94  years  of  pay  (1.96  years
for  coachers).  The  support  program  for  chose  who  are  re-deployed
includes  information,  counselling  and  placement  secvioes,  training
opportunities  at  existing  vocational  and  tcechnical  training  centers
and  assistance  ln  agricultural  production  through  provision  of  land,
inputs,  extension  services  and  transicional  food  aid.Contact
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